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Foreword: 
 
I have always found the topic of climate change policy in Canada interesting and worth 
pursuing. In Canada, environmental or climate change policy is not a straightforward “save the 
environment” endeavour, rather, climate change or environmental policy is very much an effort 
that has political roots. Perhaps what further spurred my interest in climate change policy is the 
fact that Alberta, a province that should be last in implementing a carbon reduction policy, joined 
the club by implementing a carbon tax. With Ontario and Alberta joining Quebec and BC for 
provinces with carbon reduction policies, I thought an important question to ask is how impactful 
will these policies be at actually reducing carbon emissions, or will they simply be half-
measures. To go about answering this, I evaluated all four policies using a set of criteria derived 
from via a literature review. 
In many ways evaluating these four policies not only has allowed me to understand how 
each policy functions in great detail, but perhaps more importantly, it exposes not only the 
policies faults but the opportunities for improvement. In a sense, it has helped me understand 
what types of characteristics climate change policies that rely market mechanisms require to be 
successful. More broadly, this evaluation has taught me how to use an evaluative framework, but 
also how to effectively put one together. This major paper relates to my plan of study in many 
respects; it satisfies my learning objects 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4, which are to gain an in-depth 
understanding of British Columbia’s and Alberta’s carbon tax, and Quebec’s and Ontario’s cap 
and trade system. This paper also bleeds into my first component learning objectives but to a 
lesser extent. 
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Abstract: 
Using a framework, this paper evaluates British Columbia’s and Alberta’s carbon tax and 
Ontario’s and Quebec’s cap and trade system, to determine how effective these policies will be at 
reducing GHG emissions cumulatively. The framework has been primarily shaped via a 
literature review. The framework consists of the following evaluative criteria: A) policy 
effectiveness, B) allocation of public resources and C) policy design. Each criterion consists of 
multiple questions and sub-questions which are used to determine the effectiveness of the policy. 
The criterions take into account things such as the carbon scope, price of carbon, the extent of 
emission reductions, actual and anticipated reductions, allocation of generated revenues, political 
acceptability, gaming prevention, policy rigorousness, evaluation, and transparency. Since all 
policies besides BC’s are in their infancy, to satisfy the criteria, this paper primarily utilizes 
government documents, working paper, and commentaries. Recommendations and findings are 
summarized in the appendix. 
Current modeling and data suggest that all four policies will not result in enough 
emission reductions to allow the respective provinces to achieve their emissions reduction goals. 
Although, some are further off the mark than others. However, it is blatantly clear that the 
recommendations that are required with the timeframe allotted is steep to say the least. 
Ultimately, each policy can benefit from a price on carbon that is significantly greater than 
$30/tCO2e and a much leaner scope. Particularly, Alberta and Ontario damage their scope 
substantially to preserve their large emitters. Blanketed exemptions seem to be a popular theme 
between these two provinces. Better redistribution of revenues to achieve further reductions can 
also be had, particularly from British Columbia. Notably, Quebec sets the pace for good 
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transparency and something that the other three policies should aspire too. All provinces can also 
improve their reporting and evaluation processes.   
 
Keywords: Canadian Subnational Climate Change Policy, Carbon Reduction Mechanisms, Cap 
and Trade, Carbon Tax, Policy Evaluation 
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Chapter 1: Introduction/Background 
 
With the implementation of carbon taxes in Alberta and BC, and Cap and Trade Systems 
in Ontario and Quebec, there could be a shift in climate change policy in Canada. This paper 
seeks to evaluate these four policies using a comprehensive evaluative framework. The goal is to 
determine whether these policies cumulatively are sufficient enough to reduce Canada’s carbon 
dioxide emissions in a significant manner. The first chapter of this paper is an introduction and 
background section that summarizes some of the influences of environmental policy in Canada, 
Canada’s international commitments, as well as a breakdown of some of the types of 
environmental policy instruments typically used in Canada. Since this paper primarily is 
concerned with carbon taxes and cap-and-trade or emissions trading systems, I introduce both 
mechanisms, although a greater amount of detail is given to them in the case studies, which is in 
the third chapter. In the second section, I outline the methodology of this paper, as well as layout 
the evaluative framework and justify its use. The third section is where I evaluate each policy 
through the evaluative criteria put forward. In the fourth section I make recommendations as to 
how the policy can be altered or modified to increase carbon dioxide reductions. Lastly, in the 
conclusion I answer the question above by taking the evaluations and the corresponding 
recommendations into considerations.  
 
1.1 The Economy vs The Environment  
 
It is held that the environment can be considered as a “post-materialist value”. In that, 
individuals view and value the environment as a function of their well-being (Anderson & 
Stephenson, 2016, p. 6). However, an individual’s concern over the environment will only 
increase under two scenarios: i) when there is noticeable environmental degradation, and ii) 
when economic issues are not present (Ibid, pp.5-6). When translated to the politics and policy 
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sphere, when unemployment increases, the demand for government spending on the environment 
drops at a ratio of 6:1 (Ibid, p.11). That is, for every 1% drop in unemployment, demand for 
government spending on the environment drops by 6% (Ibid). While concern over the 
environment may still be high amongst voters, in times of economic hardship, voters are 
compelled to act in a way that would serve their economic interest (Ibid, p. 13). This is what 
Anderson and Stephenson explain was the reason for the Conservative Party victory in the 2008 
and 2011 Canadian Federal elections: “despite their reputation as the least environment-friendly 
party [the Conservative Party won the 2008 and 2011 election] for two reasons: the environment 
was simply not the most salient issue for voters, and the Conservatives were seen as best on an 
issue that was salient – the economy (Ibid, p. 17).”     
Canada can be defined as a “staples state,” which is a state or economy that is reliant on 
the production and export of primary resources, such as fish, forestry, mining, and oil (Howlett 
& Kinney, 2016, p. 40). There are four stages to a staples economy, but for my purposes, Canada 
is considered an “advanced mature staples state.” An advanced mature staples state is a spin-off 
from a post-staples state, where economies typically shift away from exporting resources (Ibid, 
p. 42). In an advanced mature staples state, instead of shifting, there is a push for further resource 
extraction combined with an increase in industry subsidies (Ibid, p. 43). In other words, the 
state’s economy becomes further reliant on the extraction of a resource(s). The province of 
Alberta and its tar sands is a perfect example of this. There are two ways to extract tar sands oil: 
surface mining and in-situ mining. However, the only way for the province to exact the majority 
of the oil is to use the latter method, which is much more resource intensive than the former 
method (Nikiforuk, 2010, pp. 14-15). In the policy sphere, advanced mature staples states are 
problematic because “policy-makers often continue … to solve mature staples problems, rather 
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than promote a post-staples trajectory (Howlett & Kinney, 2016, p. 53).” This usually results in 
policies that try to promote environmental values and further entrenchment in the staples at the 
same time (Ibid).   
1.2 Federalism 
It can be said that Federalism impedes the creation of overarching environmental policy 
in Canada. In the Canadian Constitution Act of 1982, Sections 91 (federal power) and 92 
(provincial power) display an enumerated list that outlines which level of government has 
jurisdiction over what. Otherwise known as the Division of Powers, the list does not delegate 
either the federal or provincial government jurisdiction over the ‘environment.’ Instead, each 
level is given jurisdiction over a wide array of subjects that individually have implications for 
influencing how the environment is managed (Doelle & Tollefson, 2013, p. 166). This division 
has resulted in a patchwork of environmental management, whereby, there are jurisdictional 
areas that federal or provincial levels have exclusive jurisdiction over, while there are other areas 
where jurisdiction is shared by both levels (Ibid, p. 167). Legal scholars have suggested that 
because provinces have exclusive control over their natural resources, they have control of 
environmental management and policy (MacKay, 2013, p. 213). In fact, “provincial 
environmental policy [often reflects] … links between provincial governments and industry 
(Ibid, p. 214).”  
Although the division has not limited the federal government’s power over environment 
management (Ibid, p. 213), it has made the federal government “reluctant to take up 
[environmental] issues out of fear of jurisdictional entanglement (Toner & Meadowcroft, 2009, 
p. 80).” As a result, the division has forced the federal level towards collaborative approaches 
with the provinces (MacKay, 2013, p. 215). Simmons supports this by suggesting that not only 
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has the federal government been hesitant on testing the limits of its environmental jurisdiction, 
but federal and provincial harmony concerning the environment is achieved through federal 
inaction (Simmons, 2016, p. 137). It is important to note that, “initiatives in fields like the 
environment beyond what is seen to be essential to economic development occur as they become 
politically… necessary… not as a result of the state seeking an expansive role in these areas 
(Winfield, 2012, p. 6).” 
1.3 International Commitments 
 
Internationally, Canada’s environmental record has been checkered at best, with 
academics referring to Canada as once a “leader” to now a “laggard” in the international 
environmental law realm (Craik & Prior, 2016, p. 198). Perhaps Canada’s largest international 
blunder is the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto protocol was an international agreement set out in 
1997 that mandated countries to reduce their domestic GHG emissions (Macdonald, 2009, p. 
152). Canada’s GHG reduction target was to reduce their emissions 6% below 1990 levels by 
2012 (Ibid). However, after ratifying Kyoto in 2002, it became apparent that not only was 
Canada going to fail to meet its Kyoto GHG reduction commitment, but there was no indication 
that Canada was going to make a serious effort to even try (Craik & Prior, 2016, p. 203). Of 
course, in 2012, Canada withdrew from Kyoto (Ibid, p. 198).      
Recently in 2016, Canada has signed onto the new United Nations Climate Change 
Conference (UNCCC) agreement in Paris, which mandates signatories to reduce their emissions 
in such a way as to prevent the Earth’s temperature from exceeding 2oC (United Nations Climate 
Change Conference (COP 21), 2015). The agreement stipulates that every five years after 2020, 
signatories are required to review their contributions (Ibid). However, signatories cannot lower 
their targets, but they may increase them (Ibid). Canada’s Intended Nationally Determined 
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Contribution (INDC) is to “achieve an economy-wide target to reduce our greenhouse gas 
emissions by 30% below 2005 levels by 2030 (Government of Canada, 2015, p. 1).” This 
translates to Canada’s GHG emissions in 2030 to be approximately 523 MtCO2e. In order for 
Canada to achieve their Paris target, it will require the implementation of stringent climate 
change policy sooner rather than later. Any delay will only exacerbate the problem, making it 
more difficult to solve (Bertram, et al., 2015, p. 235). 
Historically, at the national level, no CO2 reduction measures have meaningfully 
materialized in Canada. However, this is no longer the case. In October 2016, the Trudeau 
government announced its plan to implement a nation-wide price on carbon (part of the Pan-
Canadian Strategy as explained below). A “floor price” on carbon will be set at $10/ tCO2e 
starting in 2018, which will increase by $10 each year until it reaches $50/ tCO2e in 2022 
(Campion-Smith, 2016). Should provinces fail to implement their own price on carbon via 
carbon tax or cap and trade system that does not meet the federal floor-price for that year, the 
federal floor price will be imposed on those province(s) (Ibid). Notably, the scope of the tax will 
be equivalent to the scope implemented in BC: “At a minimum, carbon pricing should apply to 
substantively the same sources as British Columbia's carbon tax (Government of Canada, 2016, 
p. 49).” What is also interesting is that the tax generated revenues by each province and territory 
is kept by the province and territory in question, and is spent at their own discretion (Ibid). 
Lastly, provinces and territories are recommended to provide transparent and regular progression 
reports for their carbon reductions (Ibid).  
Additionally, in early December 2016, the federal government and all provinces and 
territories, with the exception of Saskatchewan, have adopted the Pan-Canadian Framework on 
Clean Growth and Climate Change. The Framework is a strategy implemented as a means to 
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achieve the Paris targets of reducing Canada’s CO2 emissions by 30% below 2005 (523 MtCO2e) 
levels by 2030 (Ibid, p. 5). The Framework relies on subnational carbon reduction strategies with 
federal support. In terms of how reductions will occur, The Framework outlines four Pillars: 1) 
putting a price on carbon, 2) strengthening energy efficiency standards and codes for vehicles 
and buildings, 3) infrastructure that is resilient to the changing climate, and 4) investment in 
clean technology and innovation (Ibid, pp. 2-3). The federal government’s commitment to The 
Framework is as follows: $62.5 million to support the development of infrastructure for 
alternative transportation (electric, natural gas, and hydrogen); $50 million over two years to 
invest in GHG reduction technologies for the oil and gas sector; $82.5 million over two years to 
support research and development for clean energy technologies; $100 million per year for the 
Regional Development Agencies to support clean technology; $50 million over four years to 
Sustainable Development Technology Canada (SDTC) for new clean technology projects; $40 
million over five years to integrate climate resilience into building design and codes; $129.5 
million to implement science programs to inform decision-makers; $10.7 million over two years 
to implement renewable energy projects in off‑grid Indigenous and northern communities; $81 
billion over 11 years for investments in public transit; $35 billion to be invested in large 
infrastructure projects that contribute to economic growth; $2 billion investment in the Low 
Carbon Economy Fund to support provincial and territorial actions to reduce emissions; and $1 
billion invested over four years to support clean technologies in forestry, fishery, mining, energy 
and agriculture sectors (Ibid, pp. 47-8). 
1.4 Other Types of Carbon Abatement Mechanisms Used in Canada 
 
Domestically, environmental policy has typically been controlled using regulatory 
instruments. Regulatory instruments establish in law the prohibition of certain activities, 
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whereby permits may be used to control the manner in which the prohibited activity is engaged 
(Winfield, Policy Instruments in Canadian Environmental Policy, 2009, p. 47). The coercive 
power of regulatory instruments comes in the forms of fines. However, especially for larger 
firms, these fines are too low for firms to recognize them as any more than a cost of doing 
business (Ibid). In the event larger fines are available for non-compliance, maximum fines are 
seldom enforced (Ibid, p.48). Notably, regulatory instruments have proven effective should they 
be enforced vigorously (Ibid, p. 56).   
Another popular environmental policy tool of choice are voluntary instruments. As the 
name suggests, governments set up programs where firms will voluntarily reduce their own 
emissions. Of course because there is no punishment for non-compliance, voluntary instruments 
are largely ineffective at achieving the policy’s goal (Ibid, p. 50). However, the advantage to 
using voluntary instruments is that there are virtually no costs associated with them (Ibid). 
Another ‘soft’ instrument is educational. Instead of coercing behaviour change, the government 
sets up educational programs to encourage and educate sustainability (Ibid, p. 51).  
Lastly, economic instruments used to reduce carbon dioxide emissions is a relatively new 
concept for Canadian policy. However, the use of economic instruments is not new to Canadian 
environmental policy. Economic instruments were previously used to control pollutants that 
caused acid rain and sulfur dioxide (Winfield, Implementing Environmental Policy, 2016, p. 77), 
but they were never used to reduce carbon dioxide, at least not in any substantial way. Canada 
saw its first example of a carbon tax implemented in Quebec in 2007, although this tax was a 
much less substantial and comprehensive tax compared to BC’s, which was implemented the 
year after (Winfield, Policy Instruments in Canadian Environmental Policy, 2009, p. 57). In 
2008, Alberta also implemented an ETS, however, its effectiveness as a carbon reduction policy 
8 
 
has been widely criticized (Ibid). The attractiveness of economic instruments (perhaps not a 
C&T system) is the fact they allow covered emitters to reduce their emissions the way they wish 
and at the lowest possible cost to them (Ibid, p. 53). Likewise, because governments typically 
prefer to achieve policy goals at the lowest possible cost, at least with respect to carbon taxes, 
economic instruments can be seen to be advantageous (Ibid). 
 
1.5 Market Mechanisms for Carbon Abatement: Priced Based (Carbon Taxes) 
 
 
Setting a price on carbon via a carbon tax is straightforward. Governments set a price on 
carbon, which is paid by individuals and industries that consume carbon through combustion, 
thereby allowing for the efficient reduction of emissions at the lowest possible cost (Stern, 2009, 
p. 99). As the price on carbon increases, it should send market signals to consumers incentivizing 
them to consume less carbon (Ibid, p. 100). Although there is disagreement over the exact price 
that carbon should be set at, it is generally accepted that the carbon price “should reflect the 
marginal social cost … of emitting one extra unit of [carbon dioxide] (Ibid).” By having the 
externalized cost of carbon incorporated in consumable goods that contain carbon input, the tax 
should ensure that “all opportunities for reducing emissions which cost less than the price [of 
carbon] will be exploited (Ibid).” This is shift is accelerated should a portion of tax revenues be 
allocated in the form of subsidies for sustainable energy programs (Winfield, 2009, p. 49). 
Paul Ekins provides a comprehensive examination of the use of market mechanisms to 
reduce emissions. “[The] hallmark of [a] good [carbon] tax [is to] … bring the private cost of 
emitting CO2 into line with social costs of global warming, [tax revenues are] expected to grow 
with income … [assuming little to no substitutability for] fossil fuel [use], it should be simple 
and cheap to administer through … existing tax structures, it [should] stimulate energy saving, 
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innovation, and investment in clean technology, [rendering] economic growth, [and lastly,] … 
regressive side effects [should be manageable] (Ekins & Terry, 2001, p. 327).” 
Another positive is that market mechanisms for carbon abatement are not prescriptive, 
since market forces, and not the government, “[allow] polluters to choose how best to adjust to 
the environmental quality standard. [Those] facing high pollution abatement costs will prefer to 
pay the tax; [while] those with low costs will install equipment to avoid paying (Connelly, 
Smith, Benson, & Saunders, 2012, p. 185).” The effectiveness of pricing carbon is most evident 
when the price coercively forces behavioural change, whereby those who cannot pay the higher 
price for carbon will reduce their emissions (Ibid, p. 186).  
There are also generally accepted disadvantages. For instance, should the price be set 
below the optimal level, the objectives of the tax may not be achieved (Ibid, p. 185). As well, a 
carbon tax, in particular, can result in disproportionality issues, whereby it typically has “a 
[greater] impact on low-income [individuals], whereas [high-income individuals] … can afford 
to pay the higher costs [since] fuel makes up a smaller proportion of their income [compared to 
low-income individuals] (Ibid, p. 187).” Should a portion of revenues not be used to minimize 
disproportional effects, the end result could be problematic.  
 
1.6 Market Mechanisms for Carbon Abatement: Quantity Based (Cap and 
Trade) 
 
Like a carbon tax, a C&T system operates in the same way in terms of coercing carbon 
reductions. For the upstream (covered) emitters, this coercion comes in the form of purchasing 
credits or allowances, while for downstream (not covered) emitters, this coercion comes from 
what is called cost pass-through (The Institute for Competitiveness & Prosperity, 2016, p. 17). 
Cost pass-through is when regulated emitters pass either some or all of the additional costs from 
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the C&T system onto the consumer, which forces consumers to then pay more for direct and 
indirect uses of carbon (Ibid). Should the cost-pass-through be high enough, it should force 
consumers to reduce their carbon consumption by investing in alternatives. 
In a traditional ETS, the numbers of allowances made available for purchase are 
controlled, while demand and supply forces determine the cost of each allowance. In both 
Ontario’s and Quebec’s case, not only are the allowances set but so is the price put on carbon. As 
an economic assertion, the more allowances that are made available, the lower the cost of each 
allowance becomes. However, when fewer allowances are made available, the cost of each 
allowance should rise. While as an economic assertion, letting supply and demand forces 
determine the price sounds fine, in practice it has proven to be problematic. This is the primary 
reason behind controlling both the number of allowances made available, as well as, the price of 
allowances.   
For example, a large issue with the European Union’s ETS is due to market instability. 
Since too many allowance credits were made available, and a floor price of allowances was not 
set, the price per allowance fell (Brink, Vollebergh, & van der Werf, 2016, p. 604). While a 
small drop in price may not be detrimental, a significant drop in price, such as in the EU, can be. 
From an anticipated starting price per allowances of € 30, in 2013 the price per carbon credit 
dropped to € 2.75 (Ibid, p. 603). When the cost of carbon dips that low, the incentive for 
companies and individuals alike to alter their carbon consumption or invest in low carbon 
alternatives in nonexistent (Ibid, p. 604). In their modeling, Brink et al. find that through market 
stability, stronger price signals can be secured, and in turn, more incentive is created for carbon 
users to alter their carbon consumption or invest in low carbon technologies (Ibid, p. 613). The 
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simplest way to achieve this is to administer a tighter cap and establish a floor price for carbon 
credits (Ibid).  
The power of a C&T system comes from the cap declining each year, where the fewer 
amount of allowances there are to purchase, the more expensive they become (Saxe, Cap and 
Trade, 2016, p. 66). Since the allowances rise in cost, the more advantageous it becomes for 
emitters to invest in energy efficient alternatives. This is easier said than done, as a cap that is set 
too low carries with it political, economic, and competitiveness ramifications, while a cap that is 
set too high results in few, if any, reductions (Ibid).  
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
 
2.1 Research Question: 
 
Are British Columbia’s and Alberta’s carbon tax, and Quebec’s and Ontario’s Cap and 
Trade System cumulatively sufficient to significantly reduce Canada’s CO2 emissions and why?  
2.2 Research Design and Methodology: 
 
The provinces of British Columbia, Alberta, Quebec, and Ontario have each put forward 
their mechanisms for reducing their carbon emissions. Separately and cumulatively, these 
provinces’ respective policies are the most substantial climate change policies implemented in 
Canada. Now with the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change, the 
importance of these policies is raised.   
I will be carrying out a policy evaluation for the four climate change policies using a 
framework that has been developed by adopting Bramley et al. evaluative framework as a 
foundation and supplementing it with a literature review of three peer-reviewed evaluations for 
BC’s carbon tax (see section 2.3). In developing the framework, I use a multi-criteria approach, 
which as Guglyuvatyy argues, is how climate change policy should be evaluated (Guglyuvatyy, 
2010, p. 357). Although such an approach forgoes an evaluation on a single plane, it does allow 
evaluation to occur in a matrix consisting of many criteria (Ibid, p. 358).  
While there are other evaluations of BC’s carbon tax, I chose these three evaluations 
because the authors’ evaluate the policy as a whole and not just in terms of one aspect, such as 
Beck et al that evaluates BC’s carbon tax in terms of its revenue neutrality or Rivers and 
Schaufele, who evaluate BC’s carbon tax in terms of its influence on gasoline. 
The original evaluative framework consisted of four individual criteria and two sub-
questions for each criterion. However, for manageability purposes, the framework has been 
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condensed to three criteria with a list of sub-set questions for each criterion. It should be noted 
that this particular framework chosen can be expanded to ask more than 15 subsets of questions. 
The subsets for this paper were chosen and crafted because they have some degree of measurable 
metric, as presented by Bramley et al. While some criteria are easier to measure than others, each 
has some type of descriptive component; again some more than others. This is because besides 
BC’s carbon tax, there is little to no information post-implementation.   
The goal of this evaluation is to determine the effectiveness of each policy in their 
capacity to reduce CO2 emissions. In evaluating each policy, I will be performing a literature 
review. The objective will be to locate and review assessments and commentaries for each 
policy, consisting of formal and informal sources of literature. Particularly for Alberta, Ontario, 
and Quebec, I will be relying on informal literature, such as working papers, assessments, and 
commentaries. I will also be using newspaper and journal articles, reports from non-
governmental organizations, and relevant government documents. 
Findings will be summarized in the Evaluative Criteria Matrix (see Appendix I), and key 
similarities and differences between the policies will be highlighted and discussed. 
2.3 Evaluative Criteria Matrix Framework and Justification: 
Elgie and McClay evaluate BC’s carbon tax using three criteria a) has the policy led to 
CO2e reductions, b) how has the policy influenced fuel prices and usage, and c) was the policy 
‘revenue-neutral’ (Elgie & McClay, 2013, p. 3). Elgie and McClay admit that disproportional 
impacts for low-income households are a criterion that should be included, but falls outside their 
scope of evaluation (Ibid, p. 2).  
Murray and Rivers evaluate BC’s carbon tax using three criteria a) scope, b) the price of 
carbon, and c) the allocation of tax generated revenues. Scope refers to the percentage of the 
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province’s CO2 emissions that are covered by the tax, and by extension, the percent of emissions 
that are not covered (Murray & Rivers, 2015, p. 676). The price of carbon refers to the price put 
on carbon, but also to the additional costs of fuels in relation to the carbon price (Ibid). Revenue 
allocation refers to whether the tax was revenue-neutral, but also whether revenues generated 
were allocated towards eliminating negative disproportional effects (Ibid, p. 677).  
Rhodes and Jaccard evaluate BC’s carbon tax using three criteria a) estimated GHG 
emission reductions, b) economic efficiency, c) administrative feasibility, and d) public 
acceptance. Estimated GHG reductions refer to the policies estimated reductions (Rhodes & 
Jaccard, 2013, p. 40). Economic efficiency refers to the cost put on carbon (Ibid). Administrative 
feasibility refers to the level of administrative complexity and cost of policy implementation 
(Ibid). Lastly, public acceptance refers to whether the policy provokes public resistance (Ibid, p. 
41). 
Bramley et al create an evaluative framework which is used to evaluate Alberta’s GHG 
reduction policies. The criteria for their framework are: a) effectiveness, b) economic efficiency, 
c) use of public resources, d) policy design, and e) accountability and adaptiveness (Bramley, 
Huot, Dyer, & Horne, 2011, p. 11). The effectiveness criteria refer to the province’s own carbon 
reduction targets (Ibid). The economic efficiency criterion refers to the extent of which the 
policy seeks to reduce CO2 emissions in relation the price of carbon (Ibid). The allocation of 
public resources criterion refers to i) the allocation of policy generated revenue and ii) the 
policy’s allocation of carbon coverage (Ibid). Regarding the latter, carbon coverage is considered 
as an allocation of public resources because it is assumed that the environment can be considered 
as a public good (Ibid, p. 14). The policy design criterion refers to the complexity of the policy, 
how rigorous the policy is regarding emission measurements, the amount of certainty the policy 
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can provide, and how well-informed stakeholders are about the policy (Ibid, p. 11). The 
accountability and adaptiveness criterion refers to transparency. That is, whether the policy is 
evaluated regularly and whether the policy can be adaptive should targets become jeopardized 
(Ibid).  
The criteria that Bramley created will form the foundation of the criteria that I will be 
using, although it will be altered slightly. Such alterations are as follows: questions regarding 
efficiency will be combined with the effectiveness questions, so will questions related to scope. 
The effectiveness criteria will ultimately consist of, whether the policy is on-track to achieving 
its respective province’s targets, what the price of carbon is, the extent to which reductions are 
being undertaken, how influential is the price on carbon on direct costs of carbon, and lastly, 
what is the scope of the policy.    
 
2.3.1 Criteria A: Policy Effectiveness: 
1A) What is the scope (coverage of carbon) of the policy? Are there any exemptions? 
 
Starting with scope: “every tonne [of CO2] uses up limited space in the atmosphere … 
and causes damage to our shared environment. [Any] … exemptions from payment of a carbon 
price [can be considered] as a subsidy, or allocation of a public resource to emitters (Bramley, 
Huot, Dyer, & Horne, 2011, p. 14).” “[Exemptions] from a carbon tax significantly increase the 
welfare cost of achieving a given emission reduction target (Rivers N. , 2010, p. 1099).” 
Bramley et al suggests that the carbon coverage of 12% can be considered as “very poor 
(Bramley, Huot, Dyer, & Horne, 2011, p. 14).” According to the Pan-Canadian Framework, the 
federal government states, “[carbon pricing should be] applied to a common and broad set of 
sources to ensure effectiveness and minimize interprovincial competitiveness impacts. At a 
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minimum, carbon pricing should apply to substantively the same sources as British Columbia's 
carbon tax (Government of Canada, 2016, p. 49).” Considering that BC’s scope of carbon 
coverage is at least 75% of CO2 emissions, this should be considered as “average,” while a scope 
of more than 12%, but less than 75% can be considered “poor,” and a scope of more than 75% 
can be considered “good.”  
2A) How does the carbon price influence the cost of direct uses of carbon and to what 
extent are carbon reductions being undertaken? 
 
Whether the price put on carbon results in carbon reductions can be explained as a 
function of marginal cost. The objective of pricing carbon is to reduce emissions by ensuring that 
the cost of products that contain carbon includes the cost of externalities caused by carbon 
emissions (Ekins & Terry, 2001, p. 333). This should result in an increased cost of carbon-
intensive products, which in turn, should reduce the demand and emissions. Whether one is 
incentivized to reduce their emissions is dependent on their marginal cost of carbon abatement 
(Ibid, p. 329). If it costs an individual less to pollute and pay the tax rather than abating 
emissions, that individual will continue to pollute, and vice versa. Whether an individual pollutes 
or abates is a function of the price put on carbon.  
The metric here is the dollar amount of carbon. Bramley et al classify $15/tCO2e as “at 
most good (Bramley, Huot, Dyer, & Horne, 2011, p. 14).” Considering that the bar has been set 
by BC at $30/tCO2e, this should be considered as “average,” while any dollar value below 
should be classified as “poor,” and any dollar between or above $50/tCO2e should be considered 
as “good” and “very good” respectively. 
3A) Is the policy on-track to achieving its own carbon reduction target and is the policy on-
track to achieving its respective province’s carbon reduction target? 
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While criteria 3A may be difficult to evaluate barring reported emissions post-
implementation, particularly for Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec, this criteria can be achieved by 
comparing what the policy is expected to achieve and what the respective province wants to 
achieve (Bramley, Huot, Dyer, & Horne, 2011, p. 11). The government must show that it is 
taking clear steps that would be indicative of further carbon reductions (Ibid). For significant 
carbon reductions to be realized, “climate policy must apply either a rising carbon price or 
increasingly stringent regulations on technologies and forms of energy [; it] … is essential to 
have at least one of these … for policy effectiveness (Jaccard, Hein, & Vass, 2016, p. 3).” This is 
supported by Sadik, “complementary policies can … improve the effectiveness of a carbon tax, 
particularly [for addressing] … emission sources which do not readily lend themselves to the 
application of a carbon tax (Sadik, 2015, p. 7).” 
For question 3A, it can be measured using the policy itself, as well as, the respective 
province’s actions towards the policy, such as adjusting the scope or the price on carbon or even 
allocating funds towards different carbon reduction initiatives. Bramley et al, for example, focus 
on the price put on carbon, the way offset credits are used, how much of a reduction in carbon 
are government investments estimated to have, whether there is an indication that the respective 
provinces will be making any changes that will be indicative of future carbon reductions, and 
modeling data where applicable.   
Although criterion 3A can be satisfied with actual carbon data post-implementation, since 
this data will be unavailable for three of the four provinces, this section will be largely 
descriptive in line with the metric provided in the paragraph above. 
2.3.2 Criteria B: Allocation of Public Resources: 
1B) Where are policy generated revenues being allocated to? 
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Revenue-neutral policies have the potential to be revenue-positive and in turn, can create 
a double dividend, which can be defined as “the economic benefit resulting from revenue-neutral 
imposition of a tax, [which] can arise if the revenue [allocated] improves economic distribution 
(Ekins & Terry, 2001, p. 334).” Should a portion of policy generated revenues be allocated back 
to tax-payers, such that the negative effects of the tax are cancelled out, it can result in increased 
economic output. 
The reallocation of policy generated revenues can also be instrumental in minimizing 
disproportional effects. Since a carbon price will negatively affect low-income households more 
than high-income households, by allocating a portion of policy generated revenues towards low-
income households, it can help minimize regressive effects (Sadik, 2015, p. 6). The allocation of 
revenues towards minimizing regressive effects enables the policy to be more progressive (Beck, 
Rivers, Wigle, & Yonezawa, 2015, p. 57). 
Disproportional effects are also felt by trade vulnerable industries. These types of 
industries are those which although are carbon intensive, are negatively affected by a carbon 
price since they compete with foreign industries that do not have a carbon price imposed upon 
them (Sadik, 2015, p. 6). Should a portion of policy generated revenues be allocated towards 
these industries, not only can it help minimize disproportional effects, but it can also aid these 
industries in transitioning to cleaner and less carbon-intensive means of production (Ibid). 
Policy generated revenues can also be allocated towards energy efficiency programs to 
expedite carbon reductions. Since a carbon price will increase energy costs, it provides an 
opportunity for fossil fuel alternatives to develop. “[A] continuously increasing energy price … 
would result in substantial investments in energy efficiency and further innovation. [Private] 
efforts … could be complemented by government initiatives to encourage energy conservation 
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and efficiency. If energy efficiency could … be increased at no net cost at the same rate as the 
price of energy, then the negative effects of the rising price on … energy … would be cancelled 
out (Ekins & Terry, 2001, p. 347).” Additionally, should the government allocate policy 
generated revenues towards incentivizing individuals to invest in energy alternatives, this energy 
shift can become expedited and in turn lead to further carbon reductions (Sadik, 2015, p. 5).   
For question 1B regarding the allocation of revenues, Bramley et al states, “[subsidies] 
for biofuels are generally thought to be very expensive on a cost per tonne basis. Subsidies for 
transit are very expensive for governments, but transit permits large cost savings for users and 
has other important benefits, such as reducing congestion (Bramley, Huot, Dyer, & Horne, 2011, 
p. 22).” The allocation of revenues can be considered “good,” if societal benefits are realized.  
2.3.3 Criteria C: Policy Design: 
1C) Is the policy simple and clear? 
 
Policies that are ‘simple and clear’ usually cost less to implement, less likely to be 
‘gamed,’ and more likely to be politically acceptable (Bramley, Huot, Dyer, & Horne, 2011, p. 
11). The clearer the policy is in terms of objectives and requirements, the easier it is to determine 
whether the policy was effective (Pal, 2009, p. 301).  
For question 1C, Bramley et al suggests that emissions-trading frameworks are most 
complex, hybrid frameworks such as Alberta’s SGER standard is less so, and a carbon tax would 
be the least complex (Bramley, Huot, Dyer, & Horne, 2011, p. 14).  
 
2C) How rigorous is the policy; is the policy evaluated regularly, and is the policy 
transparent? 
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As for rigorousness, the more rigorous the policy is in terms of measurement, the more 
accurate are the policy’s results and future predictions (Bramley, Huot, Dyer, & Horne, 2011, p. 
11). Transparency is important as it ensures that the policy is constantly evaluated for 
effectiveness (Ibid). It also ensures that the public can access information about the policy, its 
results, its evaluations, and changes (Pal, 2009, p. 303). The more scrutiny the policy undergoes, 
the greater is the likelihood that the policy will reach its stated reduction objectives (Bramley, 
Huot, Dyer, & Horne, 2011, p. 11). Although scrutiny does not guarantee anything, it does allow 
for the possibility of progressiveness (Ibid). According to Pal, progressiveness should be the end 
goal for government policy, in that, policy should constantly be developing accordingly with the 
policy’s results (Pal, 2009, p. 303). Policies that are successful should receive more funds 
towards adjacent and parallel programs, while policies that are unsuccessful, funds should be 
allocated elsewhere, but not in such a way as to jeopardize the aim of achieving greater societal 
benefits (Ibid, pp. 302-3).   
For the rigorousness criteria for question 2C, the metric is emissions measurements 
themselves. That is, who must have their emissions measured, who does the measurement and 
are the measurements open to public scrutiny (Ibid). As for whether the policy is regularly 
evaluated and transparent, for Bramley et al, it comes down to the constant issuing of news 
releases, backgrounders, performance reviews, and annual reports (Ibid, p. 15). Although annual 
reports may be unlikely to be found, it is reasonable to expect that updates should be provided to 
the public after implementation. Second, it is also important to observe whether the content the 
government is providing is “misleading” (Ibid).   
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Chapter 3: Case Studies 
 
3.1 British Columbia’s Carbon Tax 
 
3.1.1 Criteria A: Policy Effectiveness  
 
1A) What is the scope of the policy? Are there any exemptions?  
 
The scope of BC’s carbon tax is between 75-77% of the province’s emissions (Elgie & 
McClay, 2013, p. 2) (Rhodes & Jaccard, 2013, p. 39) (Murray & Rivers, 2015, p. 676).  
The province has exempted fuel that is bought and sold on First Nations land by First 
Nations people (British Columbia Ministry of Finance, Sales to First Nations, and the Exempt 
Fuel Retailer Program, 2014, p. 3). Fuel that is used as a raw material in the following ways are 
also exempt from the carbon tax: for smelting aluminum, to produce or upgrade another fuel, to 
manufacture another substance, to separate coal, in pipeline pigging, as anti-freeze in a natural 
gas pipeline, to remove natural gas impurities, or as a refrigerant in the processing of natural gas 
(British Columbia Ministry of Finance, Registered Consumers, 2015, pp. 3-4). Lastly, fuels 
intended for export from BC, locomotive fuel for interjurisdictional use, aviation fuel for 
international use, marine fuel for interjurisdictional use, and coloured or dyed fuels that are 
purchased and used by farmers are exempted from BC’s carbon tax (Government of British 
Columbia, Exemptions, 2016). Overall BC’s carbon tax has a lean scope with few exemptions 
(Murray & Rivers, 2015, pp. 682-683).  
 
2A) How does the carbon price influence the cost of direct uses of carbon and to what 
extent are carbon reductions being undertaken? 
 
When first introduced in 2008, the price of British Columbia’s carbon tax was set at $10/ 
tCO2e, increasing $5 each year until it reached $30/ tCO2 in 2012 (Murray & Rivers, 2015, p. 
676). At $30/ tCO2e BC’s carbon tax will have a 4.4% impact on the cost of gasoline, resulting 
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in a cost increase of 6.67¢/L (Murray & Rivers, 2015, p. 676). Rivers and Schaufele found that 
for every 5¢ increase in the cost of gasoline, the demand for gasoline in BC reduces by 2.1% 
(Rivers & Schaufele, 2015, p. 29). Assuming a $25/ tCO2e, the demand for gasoline would 
decline by 8.4% (Ibid). Between 2008 and 2012, fuel use in BC declined by 17.4% (Elgie & 
McClay, 2013, p. 3). In fact, between 2010 and 2013 the sale of petroleum alone in BC dropped 
approximately 5% (Statistics Canada, 2015). This has contributed to a 10% reduction in BC’s 
CO2 emissions between 2008 and 2011 (Elgie & McClay, 2013, p. 6). In BC’s Provincial 
Greenhouse Gas Inventory report, the provinces CO2 emissions for 2008, 2010, and 2012 are as 
follows: 55.9 MtCO2e (Ministry of Environment, British Columbia Greenhouse Gas Inventory 
Report 2008, 2010, p. 9), 49.4 MtCO2e (Ministry of Environment, 2012, p. 13), 49.7 MtCO2e 
(Ministry of Environment, p. 14), 50.3 MtCO2e (Government of British Columbia, 2016). As can 
be seen, between 2008 and 2010 BC’s CO2 emissions fell by approximately 11.5%; between 
2010 and 2012 emissions rose by approximately 0.5%, and between 2012 and 2014 emissions 
rose again by approximately 1.2%. Despite the increase, BC’s emissions are still down by 
approximately 10%. The largest decrease in CO2 emissions occurred when the tax first started 
and increased most when the tax hit its peak of $30/ tCO2e. In other words, emission cuts are 
most noticeable when the tax is still ‘ramping,’ but once the ‘ramping’ stops, regressive effects 
are evident.  
Regarding the capacity of BC’s carbon tax to reduce emissions, $30/ tCO2e can be 
deceiving. In 2008, reductions and investments in alternatives would be made only if doing so 
was cheaper than paying $10/ tCO2e. While from 2009 to 2012, the incentive to reduce 
emissions or invest in alternatives would only be taken should doing so be cheaper than paying 
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$5/ tCO2e. Since the ‘ramping effect’ ends after 2012, the only incentive consumers are given is 
whether alternatives are more cost effective to pursue than paying the ‘new’ cost of carbon. 
 
 
3A) Is the policy on-track to achieving its own carbon reduction target, and is the policy 
on-track to achieving its respective province’s carbon reduction target? 
 
BC’s emissions targets are to reduce the province’s emissions by 33% and 80% from 
2007 levels by 2020 and 2050, respectively (Government of British Columbia, 2008, p. 13). The 
carbon tax alone is estimated to reduce emissions by 3Mt/CO2e by 2020 (Ibid, p. 20). 
In 2007, BC’s emissions were 66.33 Mt/CO2e eq, meaning that BC’s 2020 and 2050 
emissions goals are to reach 44.44 Mt/ CO2e eq and 13.27 Mt/ CO2e eq, respectively (or reduce 
emissions by 21.89 Mt/ CO2e eq and 53.06 Mt/ CO2e, eq respectively) (British Columbia 
Climate Action Secretariat, 2016). In 2014, BC’s emissions were reported at 64.46 Mt/ CO2e eq, 
meaning that BC is short 20.02 Mt/ CO2e of its 2020 target (Ibid). Although the province still has 
three years to reach its 2020 target, it is unlikely that the provinces emissions target will be met. 
In making recommendations to the BC government, BC’s Climate Leadership Team 
stated “new policies have not been added to the original policies, which plateaued in 2012. The 
2020 target is extremely difficult to meet at this point. [The] Climate Leadership Team’s 
recommendations will not enable the province to meet its 2020 targets. The 2050 target is within 
reach with ambitious actions (Climate Leadership Team, 2015, p. 8).” The Team has 
recommended the province to make the following changes to their carbon tax if they wish to 
achieve their 2050 targets: “[Modeling indicates that [the carbon tax should] increase … 
$10/tCO2e per year … through to 2050. [The scope of the tax should be expanded] … to include 
non-combustion sources of carbon pollution that can be accurately measured (Ibid, p. 10).” 
Should this recommendation be undertaken, BC’s carbon tax would have a price of carbon at 
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approximately $100/tCO2e. Other such recommendations from the Team include allocating a 
portion of policy generated revenue to protect carbon intensive trade-vulnerable industries, 
allocating a portion of policy generated revenue to reduce BC’s PST, allocating a portion of 
policy generated revenues to establish a fund for technological development and innovation, and 
lastly, provide municipalities with funding for further emissions reductions using a portion of the 
policy generated revenues (Ibid, pp. 10-11).  
Although BC’s emission targets for 2020 may be unattainable, as the criteria states, 
consideration must also be given to the province’s actions. For example, the Minister of Finance 
has made it clear that BC’s carbon tax will remain as is: “The carbon tax base will not be 
expanded or broadened to include industrial process or other non-combustion emissions (British 
Columbia Ministry of Finance, Budget and Fiscal Plan – 2013/14 to 2015/16 (June Update), 
2013, p. 64).” The Minister cited competitiveness as the reason to not alter the tax: “Increasing 
the carbon tax rates or expanding the base to include industrial process emissions would increase 
costs for BC businesses and increase competitiveness concerns. … Maintaining the current rates 
and base will help to ensure BC is not diverging in a substantial way from policies in competing 
jurisdictions. When other jurisdictions … introduce similar carbon taxes or carbon pricing, 
government may again review and consider changes to the carbon tax (Ibid).” The Minister goes 
on to state: “[economic] analysis conducted for the carbon tax review indicates that BC’s carbon 
tax has had … a small negative impact on gross domestic product. … Increasing the carbon tax 
beyond the current $30 per tonne would have a stronger negative effect on economic growth. … 
[As] expected, the economic impact of British Columbia’s carbon tax … [on industries] … with 
high emissions intensities, such as cement production, petroleum refining, [and] oil and gas 
extraction … are most impacted (Ibid).” In the Ministry of Environment and the Environmental 
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Assessment Office 2013/14 Annual Service Plan Report, it is stated that as of 2013 “BC [has] 
placed a five year freeze on the carbon tax to allow other jurisdictions to catch up to BC’s 
leadership position … and ensures BC industries are not placed at a competitive disadvantage for 
playing their part in addressing climate change (Ministry of Environment & the Environmental 
Assessment Office, 2014, p. 11).”  Most recently in 2016, BC’s new Liberal Premier Christy 
Clark has stated that any changes to the structure of their carbon tax are improbable (Bailey, 
2016).  
Although the BC government can alter its carbon tax, it is clear that there is no plan to do 
so. In BC’s 2008 Climate Action Plan, the carbon tax rate has been given an adaptive function: 
“[after] being phased in, further tax rate changes will depend on … whether BC is meetings its 
emissions targets; the expected future impact on emissions of other policies; … the actions taken 
by other governments to reduce their GHG emissions; … and the advice of the Climate Action 
Team (Government of British Columbia, Climate Action Plan, 2008, p. 16).”  
3.1.2 Criteria B: Allocation of Public Resources 
 
1B) Where are policy generated revenues being allocated to? 
 
 
BC’s carbon tax is designed to be revenue-neutral with all generated revenues being 
allocated to income tax reduction (Murray & Rivers, 2015, p. 677). Economic models have 
shown that instead of producing an increase in household economic output (as is asserted by the 
double dividend hypothesis), the tax has produced a decrease in household economic output by 
8% (Murray & Rivers, 2015, p. 679). Although Murray and Rivers suggest that there is “no 
statistically significant effect of the carbon tax on BC’s economic growth (Ibid).” In fact, for the 
first four years of being active, BC’s GDP growth has kept up with the national average 
(Harrison, 2013, p. 19). Statistics Canada reported that between 2010 and 2014, Canada’s GDP 
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rose approximately 15%, while BC’s grew 13% (Statistics Canada, 2015). The lack of revenues 
has been linked to the lack of gasoline sales: “[The] BC carbon tax has been revenue negative, 
[collecting] … less revenue than the government initially forecasted. [This is] … due to 
unexpectedly low gasoline sales (Rivers & Schaufele, 2015, p. 29).” 
In BC, low-income households allocate 10% of their total income to carbon in which 7% 
is for gasoline, while high-income households allocate 4% of their income to carbon (Murray & 
Rivers, 2015, p. 680). To mitigate regressive effects of the carbon tax, the BC government 
created the Low Income Climate Action Tax Credit, whereby a portion of the carbon tax revenues 
are distributed back to low-income individuals and families. Eligibility for the rebate is 
dependent on family size and income. The yearly income cut-off for low-income families in 
2015 was $32,737 for a single individual family and $38,193 for a married couple with children 
(Government of British Columbia, 2016). The maximum rebate amount is $115.50 per adult and 
$34.50 per child (Ibid).  
Marisa Beck et al. examined the impact of BC’s carbon tax on households and assessed 
whether revenue-neutrality and the redistribution of revenue were beneficial to household 
welfare in remedying any regressive effects. In their findings, Beck et al. states that should 
carbon tax generated revenue not go towards BC’s deficit, “[no] revenue recycling worsens 
household welfare by 0.53%, whereas … revenue recycling worsens welfare by 0.01% (Beck, 
Rivers, Wigle, & Yonezawa, 2015, p. 54).” However, should carbon tax revenue go towards 
BC’s deficit, “BC’s welfare decreases by 0.13% without revenue recycling whereas it decreases 
by 0.08% with revenue recycling (Ibid).” Beck et al. find that revenue recycling is more 
beneficial for low-income households rather than high-income households since the former relies 
on wage income and not labour income like the latter (Ibid, p. 42). As such, BC’s carbon tax 
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appears to be more progressive towards the welfare of low-income households (Ibid, p. 58). 
Other economic models have shown that the redistribution of tax revenues to low-income 
households results in a 0.3% reduction of economic output for low-income households (Murray 
& Rivers, 2015, p. 680). Although the regressive effects of BC’s carbon tax are not eliminated 
entirely, they are minimized due to revenue recycling and redistribution. 
Tax generated revenues were also allocated towards: reducing the first two personal 
income tax brackets by 5%, reducing corporate income taxes from 12% to 10% and reducing 
small business corporate income tax rate from 4.5% to 2.5% (British Columbia Ministry of 
Finance, Budget and Fiscal Plan – 2013/14 to 2015/16 (June Update), 2013, p. 66). The 
remaining tax generated revenue was allocated to social programs such as the Northern and 
Rural Homeowner Benefit Fund, the BC’s Senior Home Renovation Tax Credit, the Children's 
Fitness Credit and Children's Arts Credit, and a Training Tax Credit. For 2011/12, BC’s carbon 
tax collected $959 million, but $1.141 billion was reallocated, meaning that the BC government 
allocated $182 million more than what the carbon tax generated (Ibid, p. 67).  
Despite the reduction in income taxes, both personal and corporate, the remainder of the 
revenues allocated do not generate societal benefits as the criteria requires. Only those that are 
eligible for the credits and are receiving them are ultimately benefiting from them. More 
importantly, these revenues are being allocated in such a way that would complement the tax and 
further reduce GHG emissions, such as a home energy retrofit fund for instance.  
Considering that the economic output of low-income individuals has suffered slightly 
from the introduction of the carbon tax, it is not unreasonable to think that disproportional effects 
could have been eliminated. Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to think that should the BC 
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government allocate tax generated revenues differently, that further emission reductions could 
have also been achieved.  
 
3.1.3 Criteria C: Policy Design 
 
1C) Is the policy simple and clear? 
 
 
Although the implementation costs of BC’s carbon tax are not explicitly stated in the 
2008 budget, there are some figures that could suggest how much money was allocated towards 
implementing the carbon tax. As part of the implementation of BC’s carbon tax, the government 
created the Climate Action Dividend, whereby a one-time $100 subsidy was provided to BC 
residents (British Columbia Ministry of Finance, Budget and Fiscal Plan: 2008/09 – 2010/11, 
2008, p. 153). The total cost of this subsidy was $450 million (Ibid). It is already established by 
not being an ETS, the carbon tax is simple and administratively cost-effective: “The carbon tax 
scores high on administrative feasibility because it only requires changing the tax rates of an 
existing tax. Thus, administrative costs to the government, companies, and final consumers are 
minimal (Rhodes & Jaccard, 2013, p. 42).”  
 In a 2008 survey completed by Ipsos Reid, it was found that 59% of British Columbians 
did not support the implementation of a carbon tax; while only 31% did support it (Ipsos Reid, 
2008, p. 1). In a follow-up survey conducted post-implementation, support for the carbon tax 
increased to 46% and non-supporters fell to 52% (Ibid, p. 2). Also, both Rhodes and Jaccard, and 
Murray and Rivers would agree that as time progresses, the public acceptance of the tax has 
increased (Rhodes & Jaccard, 2013, p. 43) (Murray & Rivers, 2015, p. 681). 
 The Pembina Institute has also been following the public opinion of British Columbians 
regarding the provinces carbon tax. In their 2011 polling data, they found that when it came to 
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the carbon tax, 41% of British Columbians believe that the carbon tax has had a negligible effect, 
33% believed it had a positive effect, and 27% believed it had negative effects (Horne, 
Measuring the Appetite for Climate Action in BC: British Columbians’ perspectives on climate 
change and carbon taxes, 2011, p. 3). When asked if the carbon rate should increase past 
$30/tCO2e, 29% of British Columbians supported the idea, 51% opposed the idea, and 21% were 
unsure (Ibid, p. 4). In a follow-up survey by the Pembina Institute, approximately half of British 
Columbians replied that they have either purchased a more efficient vehicle or drove less 
frequently in order to avoid paying a higher tax (Horne, Sauvé, & Pedersen, British Columbians’ 
perspectives on global warming and the carbon tax, 2012, p. 4). This poll is particularly 
important because whether the carbon tax is popular or not, there is at least some indication that 
it is coercing behavioural change. Additionally, there also seem to be regressive effects on public 
opinion. In this survey, only 21% of British Columbians agree that the carbon tax has had 
positive benefits, while 40% agree that the carbon tax has had negative benefits (Ibid, p. 6). 
The public opinion of British Columbians has also been followed by The Environics 
Institute. Their results support the narrative that public opinion has fluctuated over time, but 
popularity for the tax overall is now increasing: “Public support for the BC carbon tax has 
strengthened over the past year, with … 61% [of British Columbians] … saying they … support 
it (up from 58% in 2014). This matches the highest level of public support for the BC carbon tax 
since it was first introduced in early 2008. No more than 32% [of British Columbians] … now … 
oppose the provincial carbon tax (down 6 points since 2014) (The Environics Institute, 2015, p. 
6).” In fact, in a 2015 Angus Reid poll, when asked about a provincial carbon tax, 54% of British 
Columbians supported their carbon tax, while only 46% opposed it (The Angus Reid Institute, 
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Most Canadians support carbon pricing; but less consensus on effectiveness of such measures, 
2015, p. 16).”  
2C) How rigorous is the policy; is the policy evaluated regularly, and is the policy 
transparent? 
 
 Regarding transparency, BC’s carbon tax has an interesting characteristic. Since revenue 
recycling and revenue neutrality is a large component of BC’s carbon tax, each year the Minister 
of Finance is tasked with providing a schematic in BC’s yearly budget which shows how much 
revenue the carbon tax generated in the previous year and where that money has been allocated 
to (British Columbia Ministry of Finance, Budget and Fiscal Plan: 2008/09 – 2010/11, 2008, p. 
14). Should the Minister fail in the task to produce a revenue-neutral carbon tax, 10% of their 
salary is withheld (Ibid). Additionally, if in any year the amount of money allocated is less than 
the amount generated by the carbon tax, the Minister will need to provide a plan to show how 
that money will be allocated back to taxpayers (Ibid).  
 In 2013, The Minister of Finance undertook a review of the carbon tax. The review was 
to determine the impact the carbon tax had and whether to alter its structure in any way (British 
Columbia Ministry of Finance, Budget and Fiscal Plan 2013/14 – 2015/16, 2013, p. 58). The 
scope of this review was “revenue neutrality, and consider the impact of the carbon tax on the 
competitiveness of BC businesses, particularly those in the agricultural sector (Ibid).” As 
mentioned previously, the rate and scope of the tax were left unchanged, with competitiveness 
cited as the main deterrent. The revenue recycling structure also remained unchanged, with the 
Minister of Finance citing no reason other than “one of the key principles was that the tax would 
be revenue neutral – that all carbon tax revenue would be returned to individuals and businesses 
through reductions in other taxes and not used to fund government programs (Ibid, p. 59).” 
Lastly, farmers were given a pseudo-exemption of an 80% break from the carbon tax (they only 
31 
 
pay 20% of the carbon tax) (Ibid, p. 60). Notably, the Minister suggests that doing so will result 
in a benefit of $11 million annually; although there is no explanation as to who exactly benefits 
from this $11 million exemption (Ibid).  
 Each year starting from 2009, the Ministry of the Environment has been tracking the 
carbon tax indirectly through tracking the provinces GHG reductions as part of their Annual 
Service Plan Report. In 2012 and 2014 the Minister of the Environment released Progress to 
Targets Reports, outlining the province’s progress towards its reduction targets. In the 2012 
report, the Minister of the Environment stated: “the current carbon price is not a strong enough 
incentive (British Columbia Minister of the Environment, 2012, p. 22).” In fact, a wider scope 
and a greater carbon price were recommended when emissions reports were only available up to 
2010 (Ibid). Even in the 2014 Progress Report, the Minister of the Environment stated, “some 
policies lose effectiveness over time if they are not updated. For example, the carbon tax impact 
effectively diminishes if the rate remains unchanged, as inflation dampens the price signal 
(British Columbia Minister of The Environment, 2014, p. 7).” 
Lastly, every year the BC government adds to its GHG Inventory, which shows the 
reported emissions within the province broken down by ‘sector’ and ‘activity.’ Environment and 
Climate Change Canada collects the GHG data and gives it to the BC government to approve 
(British Columbia Ministry of the Environment, 2016, p. 6). Notably, as part of the Greenhouse 
Gas Emission Reporting Regulation, industrial emitters that emit more than 10,000tCO2e per 
year must report their GHG emissions (Government of British Columbia, Climate Action 
Legislation, 2017). While industries that emit 25,000tCO2e per year or more must have their 
emissions independently verified (Ibid). 
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3.2 Alberta’s Carbon Tax: 
 
3.2.1 Criteria A: Policy Effectiveness 
 
1A) What is the scope of the policy? Are there any exemptions?  
 
 
Alberta’s carbon levy, perhaps unsurprisingly, has many exemptions, which are as 
follows: natural gas that is produced and consumed on-site by conventional oil and gas producers 
until January 2023, the use of fuel by farmers for farming operations are exempt, inter-
jurisdictional flights, on-reserve fuels for Indigenous peoples, and fuels sold for export (Alberta 
Treasury Board and Minister of Finance, 2016, p. 95). The most important exemption is for 
facilities that currently fall under the SGER (Specified Gas Emitters Regulation) performance 
standard (Ibid, p. 94). SGER facilities are those facilities that emit 100,000 tCO2e and over per 
year and make up approximately half of Alberta’s yearly carbon emissions (Leach, Adams, 
Cairns, Coady, & Lambert, 2015, p. 31). Although this is not an exemption in the strictest sense, 
the exemption from the tax is to ensure that facilities are not being taxed twice for the same 
emissions (Alberta Treasury Board and Minister of Finance, 2016, p. 95). That is, should SGER 
facilities be covered under the levy, not only would SGER facilities be taxed under the SGER 
standard, but they would also be taxed under the levy as well. The SGER exemption is not 
permanent; it is only active until 2018/19, at which point, the SGER program is slated to be 
replaced by an ‘output-based’ approach called the Carbon Competitiveness Regulation (CCR). 
According to the Climate Leadership Report to the Minister, the CCR will apply to former 
SGER facilities that emit 100,000 tCO2e or more per year (Leach, Adams, Cairns, Coady, & 
Lambert, 2015, p. 31). These facilities will be subject to the $30/tCO2e that the rest of Alberta is 
subject to; however, these facilities will be allocated emission rights or credits in proportion to 
their output (Ibid). The reason for these emission credits is to mitigate the disproportional 
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impacts that trade-vulnerable sectors, such as those under the SGER standard, will face with the 
implementation of a carbon levy (Ibid). Although it is uncertain what percentage of these 
emissions are covered by the credits, the credit amount will reduce 1-2% each year and firms 
will be able to buy, sell, and trade these credits (Ibid). However, it can be speculated that the 
allocation percentage will be significant: “The emissions pricing regime we propose for large 
emitters recognizes the fact that much of Alberta’s industrial sector faces significant trade-
exposure, and emissions policies which impose high average costs of production here could shift 
activity and prosperity to other locations with no real impact on emissions (Ibid, p. 34).” Finally, 
analogous facilities that do not pass the 100,000 tCO2e per year threshold have the option to opt-
in and be treated as a large emitter (Ibid, p. 31). It must be stated that the CCR is a proposed 
replacement for the SGER standard presented by the Climate Leadership Team. As of now, all 
that is officially known is that the SGER standard will be replaced by an ‘output-based’ system. 
All other details are uncertain. Regardless, until the SGER exemption is lifted, and 
notwithstanding the other exemptions, Alberta’s carbon levy scope can be no more than 50% of 
the province’s emissions.   
The government of Alberta estimates that the levy’s scope is 70-90% of Alberta’s 
emissions (Government of Alberta, Carbon levy and rebates, 2016), while the Alberta Ministry 
of Environment and Parks estimates 78-90% (Alberta Ministry of Environment and Parks, 2015-
2016 Environment and Parks Annual Report, 2016, p. 30). However, as will be shown, given the 
exemptions, a scope of 70% is unlikely.  
According to Environment Canada’s 2013 National Inventory Report, Alberta’s 
agricultural sector is responsible for 19,209,000 tCO2e (19.21 MtCO2e or approximately 7.2% of 
Alberta’s total emissions) (Environment Canada, 2015, p. 60). Alberta’s aviation emissions are 
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responsible for 1,500,000 tCO2e (1.5 MtCO2e or approximately 0.6% of Alberta’s total 
emissions) (Ibid). According to Alberta’s 2013 Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program, Alberta’s 
conventional oil and gas sector is responsible for 8,005,223 tCO2e (8.01 MtCO2e or 
approximately 3% of Alberta’s total emissions (Government of Alberta, Alberta Greenhouse Gas 
Reporting Program 2013 Facility Emissions, 2016, p. 12). The assumption here is that all 
emissions from conventional oil and gas are exempt. What are excluded are biofuels and fuels 
used on-reserve. Lastly, for large emitters, a clue is given for their scope once the SGER 
standard is replaced. In Alberta’s 2016-2019 Fiscal Report, it is estimated that the Climate 
Change and Emissions Management Fund is expected to generate $917,000,000 in the year 
2018/19 (Alberta Treasury Board and Minister of Finance, 2016, p. 113). This is significant 
because at present, for SGER facilities to comply with the SGER standard, they must pay into 
the CCEMF. If it assumed that the regulation replacing the SGER standard only consists of a 
price on carbon of $30/ tCO2e, then in 2018/19, large emitters will be paying a carbon price on 
30.57 MtCO2e. By using the 2013 SGER emissions report (the most recent published report) as a 
reference, it can be said that large emitters could be responsible for only 23% of their emissions, 
indicating an exemption of 77%. On a provincial scale, this means that approximately 38% of 
Alberta’s emissions could be exempt once SGER regulation is replaced. This leaves Alberta with 
a carbon levy scope of 51%.  
Although some of these figures require assumptions that may or may not be correct, the 
main take away should be that exemptions for large emitters have ramifications. Notwithstanding 
the other exemptions, for Alberta’s scope estimate of 70-90% to be correct, it would mean that 
the maximum exemption for large emitters would be 60%. Should this be the case, it would 
mean that the CCEMF`s revenues for 2018/19 are short by $508,780,000.    
35 
 
2A) How does the carbon price influence the cost of direct uses of carbon and to what 
extent are carbon reductions being undertaken? 
 
Alberta’s carbon tax took effect January 1, 2017 starting at $20/ tCO2e and will increase 
to $30 in 2018 (Government of Alberta, Carbon levy and rebates, 2016). For a consumer to pay 
the tax and pollute would mean that doing so would be cheaper than investing in alternatives, 
should alternatives cost more than $20/ tCO2e in 2017 and $10/ tCO2e in 2018. Since there is no 
ramping effect after 2018, further incentives to reduce carbon consumption will depend on 
whether alternatives are more cost effective to pursue than paying the ‘new’ carbon cost. 
The impact Alberta’s carbon levy has on direct uses of carbon, such as the cost of 
gasoline, for example, will be 4.49¢/L in 2017 and 6.73¢/L in 2018 (Alberta Treasury Board and 
Minister of Finance, 2016, p. 106). Assuming households use 135 GJ of natural gas and 4500 L 
of gasoline per year, the carbon levy will raise household fuel costs by an additional $338 in 
2017 and $508 in 2018 (Government of Alberta, Carbon levy and rebates, 2016). It is estimated 
that indirect costs of carbon (products that, although do not contain carbon, are influenced by the 
carbon price) caused by the carbon levy will range from an additional $50 - $70 per year per 
household in 2017, and $70 - $105 per year per household in 2018 (Ibid). The carbon levy is then 
estimated to impact households a total of $388 - $408 in 2017 and $578 - $613 in 2018. 
As with BC’s case, we should expect the largest amount of carbon reductions to occur the 
year of implementation. While reductions in the second year of implementation, or the “ramping-
up” year, should still occur although may not be as significant as the first wave of reductions. 
In the Climate Leadership Report to the Minister, which was created to provide the 
Minister of Environment and Parks advice regarding the development of a comprehensive 
climate change strategy, stated “the carbon prices contemplated in this report will not drive 
radical changes in prices, behaviour, or emissions in short order, simply because we are not 
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proposing radical policies, but a managed transition (Leach, Adams, Cairns, Coady, & Lambert, 
2015, p. 33).” The report goes on to state that a $30/tCO2e price on carbon “will change people’s 
behaviour at the margin. It will create a competitive advantage for lower carbon products and 
means of production and in so doing will drive innovation to create new technologies to 
capitalize on these advantages (Ibid, p. 34).” In other words, while Alberta’s carbon levy will 
produce benefits, reductions will not be significant. The price on carbon of $30/tCO2e is set to 
provide a nudge for Albertans to start investing in alternatives at the margins. 
3A) Is the policy on-track to achieving its own carbon reduction target, and is the 
policy on-track to achieving its respective province’s carbon reduction target? 
 
 As part of Alberta’s Climate Leadership Plan, on January 1, 2016 the $15/ tCO2e for 
SGER facilities was raised to $20 and is set to increase by an additional $10 to $30 the following 
year (Alberta Treasury Board and Minister of Finance, 2016, p. 93). SGER facilities will also be 
tasked to achieve a greater reduction in their emissions intensity output from their baseline 
emissions. The current reduction requirement of 12% was raised to 15%, and in 2017, it will be 
raised again to 20% (Government of Alberta, 2016, p. 8). To clarify, compliance for SGER 
facilities will require emission intensities relative to their particular baseline, to be less than 85% 
for 2016 and 80% for 2017. 
In five year increments, Alberta’s emission reduction targets from 2008 business-as-usual 
(the amount of emissions estimated to be released should no action be taken) for 2020, 2025, and 
2030 are 261 MtCO2e (50 MtCO2e below BAU or 16%), 249 MtCO2e (72 MtCO2e below BAU 
or 22%), and 238 MtCO2e (91 MtCO2e below BAU or 27%) (Leach, Adams, Cairns, Coady, & 
Lambert, 2015, p. 25).  
Alberta’s carbon levy is expected to reduce the provinces carbon emissions by 20 
MtCO2e by 2020 and 50 MtCO2e by 2030 (Ibid, p. 40). These estimates take into consideration 
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the actions that the government of Alberta is currently undertaking, such as redistributing carbon 
levy generated revenue towards renewable energy programs, green infrastructure, technological 
development and innovation, and minimizing disproportional effects (Ibid, p. 42). However, the 
estimates also take into consideration a carbon price of $30/ tCO2e that increases by 2% each 
year above inflation, which is a ‘ramping’ function that the government of Alberta has yet to 
confirm that the levy will have (Ibid, p.40). It is observable that Alberta’s carbon levy alone will 
not produce sufficient reductions that would allow the province to meet its emissions targets. 
Even if the 20 MtCO2e reduced from Alberta’s methane reduction program is included (Ibid, p. 
65), Alberta would still be short 10 MtCO2e from its 2020 target and 21 MtCO2e short from its 
2030 target.   
Other modeling data provided in the Climate Leadership Report to the Minister suggests 
that Alberta’s emissions targets are significantly unrealistic. This particular model assumes a 
price of $30/tCO2e starting in 2018 and ramps up yearly until it reaches $100/tCO2e in the year 
2030. What is troubling is that this model has a ramping effect of approximately $6/tCO2e per 
year, which is significantly larger than a 2% increase, and still, Alberta is slated to miss their 
2030 target by 12 MtCO2e (Ibid, p. 25). 
 
3.2.2 Criteria B: Allocation of Public Resources 
 
1B) Where are policy generated revenues being allocated to? 
 
Alberta’s carbon levy is revenue-neutral. The government of Alberta has estimated that 
the levy will result in a positive economic impact, increasing Alberta’s GDP by 0.4% by 2020 
(Government of Alberta, 2016). The government also estimates that five years after 
implementation, the carbon levy will generate $9.6 billion in revenues (Government of Alberta, 
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Carbon levy and rebates, 2016). These revenues will be re-allocated as follows: $3.4 billion will 
be allocated to large-scale renewable energy projects, $2.3 billion will be allocated to carbon 
rebates for low and middle-class households, $2.2 billion will be allocated to green transit 
infrastructure, $865 million will be allocated to small businesses, $645 million will be allocated 
to the Energy Efficiency Alberta agency, and $195 million will be allocated to a coal transition 
fund for coal-intensive and Indigenous communities (Ibid).  
For the $2.3 billion being reallocated to low and middle-class households, Alberta has 
split the carbon rebates into two categories: full rebates and partial rebates, which are determined 
based on family size and income. Those that will be receiving a full rebate to offset the 
additional costs of the carbon levy are families that generate $47,500 per year or less and 
families with children that generate $95,000 per year or less (Ibid). Those that will be receiving a 
partial rebate are single individual families that earn $51,250 per year or couple families with 
children that earn between $100,000 and $103,000 per year (Ibid). The rebate itself is split up in 
the following way: in 2017, $200 for an adult, $100 for a spouse, and $30 for each child of the 
household (maximum rebate of $120) (Alberta Treasury Board and Minister of Finance, 2016, p. 
98). In 2018, the rebates will increase to $300 for an adult, $150 for a spouse, and $45 per child 
(Ibid). For a family of four (two adults and two children), the maximum amount of rebate an 
eligible household is expected to receive in 2017 is $360 and $540 in 2018 (Ibid). 
Considering the estimated additional costs that the carbon levy is said to create, those 
households eligible for a full-rebate will have these additional costs covered. This observation is 
supported by Winter and Dobson, whom through their own evaluation of Alberta’s attempt at 
minimizing disproportional effects, found “only households in the highest income quintile are 
expected to incur total direct carbon-tax costs that exceed the amount of the rebate. Households 
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will incur additional indirect costs … but these are likely to be small relative to the direct costs. 
This suggests that households in the first and second income quintiles, which are most likely to 
receive the full rebate, will likely be made better off after accounting for both the costs of the 
carbon tax and the rebate. Households in the third income quintile may not be made strictly 
better off but they should come close to breaking even (Winter & Dobson, 2016, p. 5).” In other 
words, households that would be impacted most by the carbon levy are eligible for a full-rebate 
and more.  
Alberta’s carbon levy also plans to distribute generated revenues towards energy 
efficiency programs, such as bioenergy, green infrastructure, innovation and technology, and 
renewables (Ibid, pp. 37-8). It is largely unknown what exactly these energy efficiency programs 
consist of and how they will reduce emissions. It is also unknown how the levy generated 
revenues will be used within the context of these energy efficiency programs. What is known is 
that by 2030, Alberta plans to add 5,000 megawatts of renewable energy (either from solar, wind 
or hydro), which is estimated to generate $10.5 billion in new investment and create 7,200 new 
jobs (Government of Alberta, Renewable Electricity Program, 2017).  
The most information available is on the newly created government agency Energy 
Efficiency Alberta. Alberta’s Energy Efficiency Advisory Panel was created to advise and make 
recommendations to the government of Alberta with regards to Energy Efficiency Alberta. One 
of the recommended actions is the Residential Direct Install program, which is designed to allow 
consumers to have low-cost energy efficiency products, such as LED lights, smart power bars, 
low-flow showerheads, and smart thermostats at no cost (Alberta's Energy Efficiency Advisory 
Panel, 2017, p. 44). Other recommendations offered by the Panel are to provide incentives to 
consumers to purchase ‘top-tier’ energy efficient technologies and appliances, a solar panel 
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incentive program, and an incentive program for businesses to make their buildings more energy 
efficient (Ibid, pp. 44-5). The Residential Direct Install program has started (Alberta Ministry of 
Environment and Parks, Register now for no-charge energy efficiency program, 2017). The 
Residential and Commercial Solar Program has also started, which seeks to add 10,000 new solar 
panels by 2020, and by 2019, the program is expected to create 900 jobs, cut solar costs by 30%, 
and reduce the provinces GHGs by 500,000 tCO2e (Alberta Ministry of Environment and Parks, 
Rebates to help Albertans tap solar resources, 2017).    
It is too early to determine if the Alberta government has decided to redistribute levy 
generated funds to energy efficiency programs will be beneficial. On the one hand, it can be said 
that it looks promising, but on the other, it may be considered promising only because not much 
is known. For these allocations to be effective and efficient, the societal benefit that these 
programs provide needs to outweigh the social costs of implementing the levy (McKenzie, 2016, 
p. 10). Again, while green infrastructure and transportation, and innovation and development for 
renewables will no doubt have a positive societal benefit vis-à-vis lower emissions, without a 
detailed plan of these programs, it is difficult to say for sure what can or cannot be achieved. 
It is also too early to assess whether the redistribution of levy generated revenues into 
efficiency programs and green infrastructure will be effective in reducing the province’s 
emissions. There is some commentary to suggest that the $645 million allocated for Energy 
Efficiency Alberta may not be enough. In a report by the Pembina Institute, it was estimated that 
should Alberta invest heavily ($34 per capita per year) in energy efficiency programs, Alberta 
can create 15,000 jobs, increase its annual GDP by $3 billion, reduce annual electricity and fuel 
costs by 1.75%, and reduce natural gas costs by 1.25% (Becker & Hastings-Simon, 2017, p. 7). 
In other words, for these results to be realized, the government of Alberta would need to allocate 
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$144,252,900 of levy generated revenue per year towards Energy Efficiency Alberta. With the 
current allocation of $645 million over five years ($129,000,000 per year), the Alberta 
government is short $15,598,600 per year. The report goes on to state “[to] increase the 
effectiveness of efficiency programs, additional income sources should be considered (Ibid, p. 
27).” On a positive note, the Climate Act itself restricts the use of levy generated revenues to 
initiatives related to reducing GHGs, climate change adaptation, minimizing disproportional 
impacts of low-income households, and other such tax credits or reductions (Province of Alberta, 
Climate Leadership Act - Chapter C-16.9, 2017, pp. 9-10).    
 
3.2.4 Criteria C: Policy Design 
 
1C) Is the policy simple and clear? 
 
 Before implementation, polls were displaying a relatively positive reception to Alberta 
adopting a climate change policy. In 2015, 50% of Albertan’s were supportive of an economy-
wide carbon tax, which jumped to 72% when told that revenues would be allocated to green 
infrastructure and community projects (Pratt, 2015). However, support dropped to 52% when 
told that revenues would be allocated to reduce income taxes (Ibid). Furthermore, in 2016, 67% 
of Albertan’s now oppose the carbon levy (Wood, 2016). Another poll in 2016 found that 63% of 
Albertan’s oppose the carbon levy, while 53% oppose Alberta’s climate leadership plan 
(Dormer, 2016). It has been suggested by Alberta’s Environment Minister Shannon Phillips that 
the reason Alberta’s carbon levy is so unpopular is that Albertans do not have enough of an 
understanding of the carbon levy (CBC News, 2016). In part, Minister Phillips is not wrong. The 
government has implemented a half-finished carbon levy. As such, it should not be unreasonable 
to suggest that Albertans do not have a full understanding of the policy.  
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For implementation costs, while I was unable to find direct figures for the cost of 
Alberta’s carbon levy, I was able to find figures for the Panels the government of Alberta put 
together for the specific reason of the carbon levy. In June of 2015, the Climate Change 
Advisory Panel was established by the government of Alberta to advise the government on 
greenhouse gas reduction policies. The cost in carrying out the panel’s mandate was 
approximately $2.1 million (Alberta Ministry of Environment and Parks, 2015-2016 
Environment and Parks Annual Report, 2016, p. 30).   
Similar to the role of the Climate Change Advisory Panel, the government of Alberta 
established the Energy Efficiency Advisory Panel, which was asked to provide the government 
with recommendations for Energy Efficiency Alberta with regards to its long-term goals and 
objectives while taking into consideration the opinions of the public, stakeholders, NGOs, 
academics, municipalities and First Nations (Alberta's Energy Efficiency Advisory Panel, 2017, 
p. 14). The Ministry of Environment and Parks did not provide a cost figure for the Energy 
Efficiency Advisory Panel, but they did provide the cost of their entire provincial energy 
efficient plan, which is priced at approximately $7.4 million (Alberta Ministry of Environment 
and Parks, 2015-2016 Environment and Parks Annual Report, 2016, p. 36). 
The government of Alberta has also created two other such advisory groups, though 
neither group has completed their mandate yet. One is the Climate Technology Task Force, 
which focuses on innovations and technologies that can contribute to a global low carbon 
economy and provide recommendations on specific outcomes (Government of Alberta, Climate 
Technology Task Force, 2017). The other is called the Oil Sands Advisory Group, which is 
mandated to consider how to implement the 100 MtCO2e per year limit for the oil sands industry 
and provide advice to government on investing carbon price revenue in innovations that reduce 
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future emissions intensity (Government of Alberta, Oil Sands Advisory Group, 2017). 
Presumably, these two advisory panels will increase the implementation time and costs of the 
carbon levy. Although for how much and how long is uncertain. The exact costs involved with 
the creation of these two advisory panels are still uncertain.   
 Alberta’s carbon levy is more complex than that of BC. Not only is the levy not yet 
finished in its entirety, but it also is not politically acceptable, and implementation costs can be 
seen to reasonably exceed $9.5 million. Additionally, should large emitters become subject to an 
ETS, it will no doubt increase the complexity of the carbon levy. Overall, the clear and 
simplicity component of the evaluative framework is not compelling. 
2C) How rigorous is the policy; is the policy evaluated regularly, and is the policy 
transparent? 
 
 In evaluating Alberta’s carbon levy for transparency, BC’s tax can serve as a useful 
proxy. BC’s carbon tax can be considered transparent because the Minister of Finance is 
mandated to review the carbon tax every year and evaluate it every three years. In examining 
Alberta’s Climate Leadership Act, it seems that the legislation gives the Minister of Environment 
and Parks the responsibility to collect information and evaluate the carbon levy (Province of 
Alberta, Climate Leadership Act - Chapter C-16.9, 2017, p. 56). However, it is not clear whether 
the Alberta Minister is held to the same accountability standard as the BC’s Minister of Finance 
(Government of British Columbia, Carbon Tax Act, 2008).  
It should be expected that progress reports would continue to be provided by the Minister 
of Environment and Parks in their annual report as is currently done, however, this should not be 
taken as consolation. I am not suggesting that Alberta’s carbon levy will not be regularly 
evaluated, I am pointing out the difference between the two regimes. Without regular evaluation 
how is the government supposed to know how the levy is performing against their targets and 
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whether alternative measures should be taken. “[Performance] measurement … entails a 
management regime that requires a public organization to have a clear idea of what its objectives 
are, and a regular means of reporting on its success in achieving on those objectives. … 
Performance measurement should be viewed as … [trying] to link results with strategic planning 
an budgeting and resource allocation (Pal, 2009, p. 301).”   
The Climate Change Leadership Panel recommends that the Alberta government 
undertake periodic reviews of its climate change policies, whereby policies can be evaluated and 
adjusted according to the province’s goals and objectives (Leach, Adams, Cairns, Coady, & 
Lambert, 2015, p. 30). As of yet, there is no indication to suggest that the government of Alberta 
has adopted this recommendation. Although, in examining Alberta’s Climate Act: Chapter C-
16.9, it seems to give power to the Lieutenant Governor in Council to expand or contract the 
scope of the carbon levy (Province of Alberta, Climate Leadership Act - Chapter C-16.9, 2017, 
p. 59). However, it is not explicitly stated that the scope could be altered according to the 
performance of the levy. Similar recommendations were made by the Energy Efficiency Alberta 
Advisory Panel with regards to Energy Efficiency Alberta. Such recommendations entail clear 
reporting, approval, and evaluation procedures; third-party evaluators; transparency; 
accountability; access of data and information; track outcomes against performance targets; and 
set up a formal process to assess and report on all performance targets and indicators (Alberta's 
Energy Efficiency Advisory Panel, 2017, p. 36).  
 On to rigorousness, facilities that emit more than 50,000 tCO2e under the SGER standard 
must report their emissions (Government of Alberta, Alberta Greenhouse Gas Reporting 
Program 2013 Facility Emissions, 2016, p. 9). Such facilities include conventional and non-
conventional oil and oil sands operations, coal mining, natural gas generation, and electricity 
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generation, to name a few (Ibid, p. 10). For mandatory reporting facilities, their data is then 
checked and confirmed by Environment and Climate Change Canada and the Alberta Climate 
Change Office (Ibid). For facilities that emit less than 50,000 tCO2e per year, emissions’ 
reporting is voluntary (Ibid, p. 11). Under the Climate Change Emissions and Management Act, 
incorrect reporting by those facilities where reporting is mandatory can result in a fine of up to 
$500,000 (Province of Alberta, Climate Change and Emissions Management Act - Specified Gas 
Emitters Regulation - Alberta Regulation 139/2007, 2007, p. 28). Although GHG reporting for 
SGER facilities is made available for public scrutiny, reporting is three years behind. The 
documents themselves are detailed. Emissions reported is broken down by sector, emission type, 
the source of combustion, as well as, comparing current reporting data with the previous years 
and baseline year data. 
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3.3 Ontario’s Cap and Trade System 
 
3.3.1 Criteria A: Policy Effectiveness:   
 
1A) What is the scope (coverage of carbon) of the policy? Are there any exemptions? If so, 
what are the extent of the exemptions?  
 
Ontario’s C&T system divides participants into three categories: mandatory, voluntary, 
and market participants. Mandatory participants are facilities and natural gas distributors that 
emit 25,000 tCO2e eq per year, fuel suppliers that sell more than 200 litres of fuel per year, and 
electricity importers (Ministry of the Environment & Climate Change, Cap and trade: program 
overview, 2016). Voluntary participants are those facilities that emit between 10,000 tCO2e eq 
and 24,999 tCO2e eq per year (Ibid). These facilities may opt into Ontario’s C&T program and 
will be treated as if they were mandatory participants (Ibid). Regardless of their emissions 
output, electricity generators whose emissions are covered upstream and natural gas distributors 
are illegible to be voluntary participants (Ministry of the Environment & Climate Change, Cap 
and trade: register as a voluntary participant, 2016). Lastly, market participants are companies, 
organizations, and individuals with no emissions to report, and no compliance obligation, but 
may choose to participate in emission credit auctions (Ministry of the Environment & Climate 
Change, Cap and trade: program overview, 2016).     
 At the end of each compliance period, mandatory participants, and voluntary participants 
that opt in to Ontario’s C&T system must have enough emissions allowances, offset credits, or 
early reduction credits equivalent to their total tCO2e eq throughout the compliance period (Ibid). 
For the first compliance period (January 1, 2017 to December 31, 2020), the government of 
Ontario has awarded the majority of large emitters with free emissions allowances although the 
amount of allowances allocated is set to decrease each year (Ibid). 
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In 2017, Ontario’s total GHG emissions are predicted to be 172.5 Mt/CO2e (Saxe, Cap 
and Trade, 2016, p. 65). According to the Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change, 
Ontario’s C&T program will have a scope of 82% of Ontario’s GHG emissions (Ibid). GHG 
emitters, such as electricity importers, gas-fired generators, natural gas distributors, and other 
distributors of fuels, which make up 100 Mt/CO2e of Ontario’s emissions will be forced to have 
their emissions covered by emission allowances (Ibid). Large industrial emitters, which comprise 
of 40 Mt/CO2e of Ontario’s emissions will have their emissions provided for them free of charge 
for the 2017-2020 compliance period (Ibid, p. 66). The number of free allowances allocated to 
large emitters will decrease 4.57% each year (Ibid, p. 68). The remaining 31Mt/CO2e that is 
attributed to primarily by the agricultural, waste management, and forestry sectors, they will not 
be required to have their direct emissions covered for the first compliance period (Ibid, p. 66). 
Nonetheless, their indirect emissions, those produced by their suppliers of petroleum products, 
natural gas, and electricity, will need to be covered via emissions allowances (Ibid).     
Ultimately, free allowances allocated to large emitters are done to maintain economic 
competitiveness and minimize carbon leakage (Ibid). The trade-off is that free allowances 
undermine the financial incentive for large emitters to switch to alternatives, reduce the amount 
of money the government is eligible to collect and decrease the effectiveness of the C&T system 
itself (Ibid). When given a restricted scope, a carbon tax or a C&T system will be less effective 
than if the policies operated with a larger scope (Beugin, Dion, Elgie, Olewiler, & Ragan, 2017, 
p. 13). The wider the scope that a carbon price is applicable too, the more effective that price is 
at encouraging or incentivizing investment in alternatives, and in turn, reducing emissions. 
According to the ECO, no sufficient evidence currently exists to justify the blanket allocation of 
free allowances to all EITE (Emission-Intensive and Trade-Exposed) emitters (Saxe, Cap and 
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Trade, 2016, p. 68). Not providing free allowances to large emitters can be equally as 
problematic as if they were. In their report, Sawyer et al. state that even with large emitters 
having their emission allowances covered free of charge, Ontario is still expected to experience a 
decrease in exports, which is indicative of carbon leakage (Sawyer, Peters, & Stiebert, 2016, p. 
6). The drop is considered to be minimal, but there still exists a real risk of investment leaving 
Ontario in favour of other jurisdictions (Ibid, p. 7).  
The availability of early reduction credits seems to pose a scoping issue. Early reduction 
credits allow for emitters to earn emission allowances for emissions already reduced between 
2012 and 2016 (Ministry of the Environment & Climate Change, Cap and trade: program 
overview, 2016). It is said that up to two million credits (2 Mt/CO2e) would be issued (Ibid). The 
scoping problem in question is that not only can these credits be used towards future compliance 
periods, but according to the Auditor General, Ontario’s emission cap does not take these credits 
into account (Lysyk, 2016, p. 173). This means that whatever the cap is set at, there is a 
possibility that two million additional credits may be available in the secondary market. Notably, 
large emitters will be able to use 8% of their early reduction credits, earned offset credits, or a 
combination of the two towards covering their emissions for any compliance period (Ibid, p. 
172).  
The most concerning aspect of Ontario’s C&T system is the allocation of free allowances 
for large emitters. The implications are that 40 Mt/CO2e, or 23% of Ontario’s 2017 emissions, 
will not be accounted for; not to mention the direct emissions from the agricultural, waste 
management, and forestry sectors. Modeling data and the literature both agree that carbon 
leakage can have major competitiveness consequences. Conversely, should effectiveness be the 
primary objective, there is a particular balance between carbon leakage and carbon reduction. 
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Perhaps then, the most important question is whether a blanket exemption is advantageous for 
the effectiveness of Ontario’s C&T system. 
    
2A) How does the carbon price influence the cost of direct uses of carbon and to what 
extent are carbon reductions being undertaken? 
 
The reserve price per carbon allowance for Ontario’s first auction held on March 22, 
2017 was $18.07 (Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change, 2017). The reserve price is 
the minimum bid that an auction participant can make for one emission allowance (Ibid). Each 
year until 2020 the reserve price is set to increase by 5% plus inflation (Lysyk, 2016, p. 159). 
This means that by 2020, the cost of carbon in Ontario would approximately be $20 /CO2e, and 
$30 /CO2e by 2028. The total number of allowances that are made available for purchase in 
Ontario is equal to the forecasted emissions for that year by covered emitters minus 4% (Ibid).  
Just like a carbon tax, a C&T system’s ability to induce carbon reductions are equal to the 
cost of reducing one unit of CO2e in relation to the cost of carbon, which in this case is $18.07 
/CO2e. However, this is only the auction price. The trading price in the secondary market can 
either be higher or lower than the auction price. Therefore, the degree that carbon reductions 
would be undertaken is equivalent to that new carbon price. 
It is suggested that Ontario’s C&T system’s influence on increased energy costs will be 
‘marginal’ (Sawyer, Peters, & Stiebert, 2016, p. 8). For households, Ontario’s C&T system will 
increase direct costs of carbon by $13 per month or $156 per year in 2017 (Ibid, p. 9). In 2019, 
direct costs of carbon for households are expected to be approximately $210 a year, plus an 
additional $75 per year for indirect costs of carbon (Lysyk, 2016, p. 169). The additional rise in 
indirect costs of carbon is estimated to be 0.02%, which translates to a decrease in household 
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incomes of approximately 0.04% in 2020 (Sawyer, Peters, & Stiebert, 2016, p. 8). According to 
the ECO (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario), the implementation of Ontario’s C&T 
system could result in the increase of household heating bills by an average of $5 per month and 
household gasoline prices by 4.3 ¢/ litre (Saxe, Cap and Trade, 2016, p. 77). The ECO notes that 
the additional direct and indirect costs of carbon “are likely too small to lead to a major shift 
towards lower carbon lifestyles (Ibid).” 
With a linked and supported C&T system as Ontario has (linked with Quebec and 
California, and EITE industries have been given free emissions allowances), its impact on the 
economy and the additional costs of carbon is small (The Institute for Competitiveness & 
Prosperity, 2016, p. 30). It can be noted that if Ontario adopted an unlinked C&T system, a 
carbon price of $157/tCO2e would have been required for Ontario to achieve its emissions 
reduction targets (Ministry of the Environment & Climate Change, How Cap and Trade Works, 
2016). Such a reality would have raised households’ carbon costs by $107 per month (Ibid).  
Additionally, according to EnviroEconomics, Ontario’s C&T program is not expected to have a 
significant impact on Ontario's GDP. Without C&T, Ontario’s GDP between 2015 and 2020 is 
projected to grow by 11%; while with C&T Ontario's economy is expected to be 10.97% 
(Ministry of the Environment & Climate Change, How Cap and Trade Works, 2016). According 
to the Institute of Competitiveness and Prosperity, in a BAU scenario, Ontario’s economy is 
projected to grow by 2.08% per year; while in a C&T scenario, it will only grow by 1.9 and 
2.05% (The Institute for Competitiveness & Prosperity, 2016, p. 30). 
It is agreed that the price of carbon in Ontario is too low to produce carbon reductions in 
any substantial way (Lysyk, 2016, p. 167). Ontario’s C&T system “does not establish a price for 
GHG emissions that would incentivize a transition to a decarbonized economy (Wilson & 
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Grochalova, 2016, p. 2).” The CELA (Canadian Environmental Law Association) recommends a 
floor price of carbon of $50/tCO2e; however, other models have suggested that a carbon price of 
$100/tCO2e still may not be sufficient for Ontario to meet its emissions reductions targets (Ibid, 
p. 3).  
 
3A) Is the policy on-track to achieving its own carbon reduction target, and is the policy 
on-track to achieving its respective province’s carbon reduction target? 
 
The government of Ontario has set the following GHG reduction targets: 15% below 
1990 (182 Mt/CO2e) levels by 2020, 37% below 1990 levels by 2030, and 80% below 1990 
levels by 2050 (Ministry of the Environment & Climate Change, Cap and trade: program 
overview, 2016). In 2017, Ontario’s total GHG emissions are predicted to be 172.5 Mt (Saxe, 
Cap and Trade, 2016, p. 65). 
In their working paper, the Institute for Competitiveness and Prosperity assumes a carbon 
price of $23.12/tCO2e for a linked C&T system in 2021 (The Institute for Competitiveness & 
Prosperity, 2016, p. 26). In a BAU scenario, Ontario’s emissions are expected to increase to 
177Mt/CO2e in 2020 and 183 Mt/CO2e in 2030 (Ibid, p. 28). In the linked and support scenario, 
it is estimated that carbon leakage would be minimal and Ontario’s emissions will be reduced by 
61Mt/CO2e (Ibid, p. 29). Conversely, in a linked system with no support, emission reductions are 
estimated to be higher at 64Mt/CO2e, in which 37.5% of this will be attributable to carbon 
leakage (Ibid). It should be noted that a linked C&T system with no support to EITE emitters 
will have significantly more force at coercing behaviour change towards fossil fuel alternatives 
(Ibid, p. 32). However, a linked and supported system is still expecting to cause some behaviour 
change, but it is estimated to be “not very significant (Ibid).”   
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The ECO came to a similar conclusion by suggesting that Ontario’s C&T system alone is 
only projected to reduce emissions by 2.8 Mt/CO2e, which in the report is considered as 
“optimistic” (Saxe, Cap and Trade, 2016, p. 77). The report goes on to state there is no “credible 
evidence that the Action Plan will produce as many emission reductions as the government 
claims, or as quickly as it predicts. Even if the Action Plan were highly successful, a large gap 
would remain between Ontario’s predicted emissions for 2020, and the 2020 target (Ibid, p. 78).”  
For the first compliance period (from 2017 to 2020), the cap of Ontario’s C&T system is 
set to decrease 4% each. Although the ECO considers this cap decline to be “aggressive,” for 
Ontario to achieve its 2030 emissions target, a minimum annual cap reduction of 4% is required 
(Ibid). Despite this, it is still suggested by the ECO that in a linked C&T system, Ontario is 
unlikely to meet its 2020 emissions reduction targets (Ibid, p. 71). The Auditor General has even 
suggested that Ontario’s emissions reductions from their C&T program would be minimal, 
estimating that Ontario’s emissions target would be missed by approximately 15 Mt/CO2e 
(Lysyk, 2016, pp. 167-168). It is estimated that Ontario’s C&T program will only be responsible 
for approximately 3.8 Mt/CO2e (Ibid, p. 168). As previously mentioned, the auction generated 
revenues that are to be allocated towards GHG reduction programs are currently forecasted not to 
generate the 10Mt/CO2e in reductions that were initially estimated (Ibid, p. 174). Even if these 
reductions were achieved, this would still leave Ontario 5Mt/CO2e short of its 2020 target. 
It is evident that Ontario is likely to miss its 2020 emissions reduction targets, however, 
the solution to close the emissions gap may be tricky. The cap decline rate is already considered 
as aggressive, although it is suggested that it may need to increase. It is equally as suggestive that 
should Ontario’s scope widen prematurely by stopping the allocation of free emission 
allowances, there could be significant competitiveness and economic ramifications. By 2030 it is 
53 
 
estimated that if large emitters are not given free allowances, Ontario’s GDP will decrease by 
2.6% (a value of $18 billion) (The Institute for Competitiveness & Prosperity, 2016, p. 30). 
   
3.3.2 Criteria B: Allocation of Public Resources: 
 
1B) Where are policy generated revenues being allocated to? 
 
Through the auctioning of emission allowances, Ontario’s C&T system is 
expected to generate approximately $478 million in 2016-17 and $1.8-1.9 billion 
annually for the remainder of the compliance period (January 1, 2017 to December 31, 
2020) (Ministry of the Environment & Climate Change, How Cap and Trade Works, 
2016). As part of Ontario’s Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, 
all generated revenues from Ontario’s C&T program are deposited into the Greenhouse 
Gas Reduction Account. The GGRA’s funding is estimated to range from $5.96 billion to 
$8.3 billion (Ministry of the Environment & Climate Change, How Cap and Trade 
Works, 2016). The Fund is solely intended to provide money for projects and initiatives 
aimed at reducing GHG emissions, such as retrofit programs, solar energy systems, 
battery storage, and building insulation (Ibid).  
As for where the money is going, according to the Auditor General, the 
Government of Ontario has a plan to allocate C&T revenues to 34 different projects 
aimed at further reducing GHG emissions. These projects range from reducing energy 
bills to planting 50 million trees. Here it should be noted that the government of Ontario 
does not put revenues towards minimizing disproportional effects for low-income 
individuals, nor does it allocate revenues to reduce carbon leakage. The latter is achieved 
through free permits.   
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According to the Auditor General of Ontario, the estimated $8 billion of C&T 
generated revenue that is reinvested to reduce Ontario’s emissions further is unlikely to 
sufficiently close the emissions gap to allow Ontario to meet its 2020 emissions reduction 
target (Lysyk, 2016, p. 174). For example, between 2017 and 2020, the Ministry of the 
Environment and Climate Change is planning to spend $1.32 billion to offset the 
additional costs of electricity bills caused by the C&T program (Ibid). While the Ministry 
claims this subsidy will result in a 3Mt/CO2e reduction since it is intended to incentivize 
individuals to switch to alternatives, the Auditor General’s report suggests that such an 
effect is unlikely considering that the subsidy will only decrease electricity costs by 2% 
(Ibid). Other such projects have also been highlighted by the Auditor General for similar 
issues (Ibid, p. 175). Most notably are the revenues allocated to zero-emission homes and 
electric vehicles. The Auditor General points out that emission reduction programs that 
utilize subsides are reliant on the assumption that the subsidy itself will be enough to 
incentivize individuals to make expensive upgrades to their homes and cars (Ibid, p. 176). 
However, such expensive upgrades would likely only be undertaken by individuals that 
could afford the upgrade regardless of the subsidy and not by those who rely on the 
subsidy for the upgrade (Ibid). Sawyer et al. suggest that such programs can help to 
minimize disproportional effects (Sawyer, Peters, & Stiebert, 2016, p. 8); however, 
disproportional effects would only be minimized for those individuals that can afford to 
take advantage of the subsidies. The Institute for Competitiveness and Prosperity also 
supports the use of C&T revenue towards subsides for zero-emission homes and cars, but 
the Institute makes it clear that the subsidy needs to be such that it will incentive 
consumers (The Institute for Competitiveness & Prosperity, 2016, p. 37) with regards to 
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the subsidy itself, as well as, the required infrastructure (Ibid, p. 38). For example, it is 
reasonable to suggest that charging stations, or the lack thereof, is a large determining 
factor in purchasing an electric vehicle. Similar concerns are also raised by the Canadian 
Environmental Law Association, which suggests that low-income people who are most 
disproportionally affected by a price on carbon and can benefit most from a lower carbon 
cost, are not the individuals engaging in these investments (Canadian Environmental Law 
Association, 2016, p. 2). The ECO has an analogous position, in that energy efficient 
subsides for low-income households do not necessarily reduce GHG emissions (Saxe, 
Spending the Money Well, 2016, p. 94). Moreover, the manner in which the Minister 
evaluates revenue spending cannot be advantageous for low-income individuals since 
low-income individuals do not emit the most carbon and therefore, this means of revenue 
allocation cannot meet the cost-effectiveness criterion or the GHG reduction criterion 
(this criterion is laid out in the section below) (Ibid). 
The government of Ontario is also allocating $325 million to the Green 
Investment Fund, which is to act identical to the GGRA. A breakdown of the $325 
million is as follows: $100 million will be invested in partnership with Enbridge Gas 
Distribution and Union Gas (Ontario Ministry of Energy, 2016). This will help 37,000 
homeowners conduct energy audits (Ibid). $20 million from the GIF will be allocated to 
build a network of public fast-charging electric vehicle stations within cities (Office of 
the Premier, 2015). $92 million will be allocated into social housing energy retrofits, 
which over a 20-year period will reduce GHG emissions by approximately 3,600 tonnes 
(Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 2016). $74 million will be allocated to cleantech 
innovation, and it will encourage large emitters to invest and adopt cleaner technologies, 
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thereby reducing GHG emissions (Ontario Office of the Premier, 2016). Lastly, $13 
million will be allocated to First Nations communities to help them towards the shift 
away from diesel power (Ministry of Indigenous Relations & Reconciliation, 2016). 
Ontario’s allocation of C&T revenues needs to be considered suspect at best. 
Large emitters are not discussed in this section because instead of allocating revenue to 
minimize carbon leakage, the province has instead opted to allocate free emissions credits 
or allowances. As for minimizing disproportional effects, there is no clear allocation of 
revenues towards minimizing disproportional impacts. The province has instead allocated 
revenues towards subsides for household retrofits, electric cars, and reducing electricity 
bills. While these initiatives can lend themselves easily to minimizing disproportional 
effects, the reductions these programs will bring will be minimal. Overall, the 
effectiveness of these types of subsidy programs has come under scrutiny since they are 
only beneficial to those that can afford to take advantage of them. Lastly, it is clear that 
the province of Ontario is relying on C&T revenues in an attempt to close the emissions 
gap between their emissions reduction targets and the actual reductions that are to be had 
by the C&T system itself. However, the current consensus suggests that the province will 
not close this gap.  
 
3.3.3 Criteria C: Policy Design: 
 
1C) Is the policy simple and clear? 
 
While not much polling data exists regarding Ontario’s C&T system, what does exist 
runs parallel to the polling data already shown in this paper. In one poll, it was found that 
approximately 56% of voters did not approve Ontario’s C&T system because monthly electricity 
rates would increase (Bozinoff, 2016, p. 3). In another study done by Nanos Research, they 
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found that approximately 61% voters opposed Ontario’s C&T system (Nanos Research, 2017, p. 
5). When asked if whether Ontario’s C&T system would be effective at reducing GHG 
emissions, there seems to be a split, in which 45% of voters responded ‘no’ and 39% responded 
‘yes’ (Ibid, p. 7). Lastly, approximately 45% of voters stated that they would be less likely to 
support a party if that party intends to pursue a C&T system (Ibid, p. 9). Interestingly, this 
number climbs to 58% should the party pursue a tax aimed at gasoline and heating fuels (Ibid).  
In my opinion, there does not seem to be enough data to show whether the voting public 
of Ontario dislikes Ontario’s C&T for the system itself or because the nature of economic 
mechanisms aimed at reducing GHG emissions through raising the price of direct costs of 
carbon. In a recent study published by Angus Reid, it was found that rising electricity costs are 
indeed a big reason for Ontario’s Premier Kathleen Wynne’s poor approval rating (The Angus 
Reid Institute, Politics Electrified: Three-in-four Ontarians say their hydro bills are 
‘unreasonable’; think they’ll rise further, 2017). While this is outside of the scope, it does point 
to why there is a correlation between disapproval of Ontario’s C&T system and increased energy 
prices. 
As for the implementation costs of Ontario’s C&T system, it is not exactly clear. In the 
Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change 2015/2016 annual report, the Ministry 
allocated $191,868,000 to Environmental Protection projects in 2015 (Ballard, 2015). 
Unfortunately, this was the most relevant figure available that would shed some light on the cost 
of implementation of Ontario’s C&T system.   
Gaming the system was not discussed for carbon taxes, but for C&T systems it can be a 
serious concern. There are many ways to game a C&T system. One such way is through false 
emissions reporting. In Ontario’s case, large emitters may find it lucrative to try to falsify their 
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emissions in an attempt to get greater allowances for free (Chan, 2010, p. 3). The same can be 
said for firms that find themselves in non-compliance, in which they may try to falsify their 
reported emissions to avoid penalties. To prevent false emissions reporting, all mandatory and 
voluntary participants within Ontario’s C&T system must report their GHG emissions every year 
(Ministry of the Environment & Climate Change, Report greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 
2016). A third party verifies all emissions reports, whereby either the Standards Council of 
Canada (SCC) and the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) ensures that any errors or 
miscalculations in emissions are fewer than 5% and to ensure that errors in production data are 
fewer than 0.1% (Ibid). Verifiers must submit Compromised Impartiality Assessment forms for 
each entity that is reviewed. A mitigation plan should also be submitted if there is a conflict of 
interest between the verifier and the entity. 
Offset credits are another potential avenue for system gaming. This involves participants 
falsifying all types of documentation to obtain offset credits (Chan, 2010, p. 6). Offset credits 
allow entities that are covered under Ontario’s C&T system to earn additional credits should 
entities undertake projects that reduce GHGs that are not already covered under the C&T system 
(Ministry of the Environment & Climate Change, Cap and trade: offset credits and protocols, 
2016). If earned, entities would be able to use these offset credits towards their compliance 
obligations (Ibid). The incentive of offset credits is that it allows entities to meet their 
compliance obligations at a lower cost than through reducing their emissions, auctions, or trading 
(Ibid). Examples of projects that would earn offset credits are tree planting, manure management 
projects to capture and destroy methane gas, and upgrading to industrial cooling systems that use 
refrigerants that have little to no impact on global warming (Ibid). The problem with offset 
credits as made clear by the Auditor General is that in some instances it is difficult to measure 
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and verify the amount of emissions reduced by these projects (Lysyk, 2016, p. 172). Currently, 
there is no regulation governing the creation and use of offset credits, although a proposed 
regulation has been created by the Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change. If approved 
as is, the proposed offset regulation would enable the Ministry of the Environment and Climate 
Change to establish a public online Offsets Registry that will contain information regarding the 
project operator and the offset project (The Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change, 
2017, p. 7). Offset credits would be awarded by the Ontario Offset Registrar and will be 
individually numbered and tracked by the CITSS (Ibid). For my purposes, before an offset 
credit(s) is awarded, all offset related documents, and physical sites must be verified by a third 
party. The Verification Report is prepared by an ISO 14065 accredited organization and a 
member of the International Accreditation Forum (Ibid, p. 18). In addition to reviewing 
documents, in order for an offset credit to be considered for approval, verifiers must visit offset 
project sites at least once (Ibid, p. 19). Notably, carbon bribery may be a future concern (Chan, 
2010, p. 4). 
The allocation, auction, and trading of emission allowances or credits is recorded by the 
Western Climate Initiative and the Compliance Instrument Tracking System Service (CITSS) 
(Ministry of the Environment & Climate Change, Cap and trade: auction of allowances, 2017). 
All participating members, whether they are mandatory, voluntary, or market participants, must 
register in the CITSS (Ibid). Without registration, participants cannot participate in Ontario’s 
C&T system (Ibid). Lastly, should emitters be in non-compliance, significant financial penalties 
will be laid. If emitters are short of allowances at the end of a compliance period, they will be 
required to submit an additional three allowances for every allowance they are short, which can 
also be converted to a debt owed to the government (Saxe, Cap and Trade, 2016, p. 75).   
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2C) How rigorous is the policy; is the policy evaluated regularly, and is the policy 
transparent? 
 
The section above concerning gaming answers many of the questions regarding 
rigorousness and measurement. As such, this section will primarily focus on transparency and 
evaluation of Ontario’s C&T policy, particularly regarding the Climate Change Mitigation and 
Low-Carbon Economy Act.   
At least once a year, the Minister of the Environment and Climate Change must report the 
status of the actions set out in Ontario’s climate change action plan (The Ministry of the 
Environment and Climate Change, 2016, p. 8). The Minister must then put the report before the 
General Assembly and make it publicly accessible (Ibid). In one’s opinion, the report should 
include a comprehensive plan if Ontario’s reduction targets seem unattainable in the initial 
timeframe. Such a comprehensive review should include a review of strengthening the floor 
price of carbon allowances, lowering future allowance caps, and a more aggressive use of GGRA 
funds. The Minister is also able to alter the number of allowances made available. In the Act, the 
Minster may only alter allowances with respect to the provinces greenhouse gas reduction targets 
(Ibid, p. 22). Although, it has been recommended by the Canadian Environmental Law 
Association that having ‘reduction targets’ as the only criterion for the number of allowances is 
not sufficient (Wilson & Grochalova, 2016, p. 4). In their view, a stringent cap to bring 
emissions reductions not only has to include GHG targets, but must also include the number of 
carbon offsets available, the number of early reduction credits made available, and should take 
into consideration the amount of allowances made available in other jurisdictions (Ibid, p. 5).  
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Act also restricts government spending from the Greenhouse 
Gas Reduction Account. Money in the account can only be used to fund projects that are 
reasonably likely to reduce GHG emissions, as well as, cover any Crown incurred costs in 
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connection with the administration of the Act (The Ministry of the Environment and Climate 
Change, 2016, p. 51). Furthermore, in order for the Minister to allocate funds from the Account 
into an initiative, the Minister must evaluate the initiative against the following criteria: A) the 
programs potential and ability to reduce GHG emissions; B) how will the program contribute to 
achieving Ontario’s GHG reduction targets; C) the program’s relationship to other initiatives; D) 
the programs relationship to the Climate Change Action Plan; E) whether the program will assist 
low-income households and vulnerable communities transition to a low-carbon economy; and F) 
other matters as the Minister considers appropriate (Saxe, Spending the Money Well, 2016, p. 
93). Once the Minister completes this evaluation, he must then put it to the Treasury Board (The 
Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change, 2016, p. 51). 
The Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act requires that the GGRA 
must undergo annual reporting, whereby in-flows and out-flows and the respective descriptions 
are kept track of (Ministry of the Environment & Climate Change, Draft Cap and Trade Program 
Design, 2016). It also ensures that GGRA funds are spent in a manner as to result in reasonable 
GHG reductions (Ibid). According to the ECO, the Minister may allocate GGRA funds towards 
future projects and expenditures, however, like current initiatives, they must meet the criterion 
listed above (Saxe, Spending the Money Well, 2016, p. 95). While it is possible for the Minister 
to allocate GGRA funds outside of the criteria’s scope, the ECO suggests that doing so will 
cause the Ontario government to subject itself to political and legal ramifications (Ibid, p. 91). 
Most importantly, every year, the Minister needs to make these evaluations available for public 
access (The Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change, 2016, p. 51).  
Since revenue reallocation is such an integral component of Ontario’s C&T system, 
accordingly to the ECO, there could be an improvement in transparency. As per the ECO, by the 
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Minister only publicising an annual report every year of the Accounts spending, it damages the 
integrity and effectiveness of Ontario’s C&T program and leaves open the possibility that funds 
could be allocated to initiatives other than what they were intended for (Saxe, Spending the 
Money Well, 2016, p. 93). To create further transparency in these annual reports, the ECO 
suggests that all initiatives, even the ones that were not funded, should be included (Ibid, p. 94). 
Lastly, as for the descriptions of the projects that are funded, the ECO suggests that a description 
that is vague and brief is the opposite of ensuring transparency (Ibid). The CELA agrees with the 
ECO such that in order to ensure transparency and that funds are allocated towards GHG 
reducing initiatives, the Account should be entirely separate from Ontario’s budget, but 
additionally, Account funds should be allocated only in a ‘direct’ manner into GHG reducing 
initiatives (Wilson & Grochalova, 2016, pp. 10-11). In this way, C&T revenues are allocated in 
such a way as to further reduce Ontario’s GHG emissions, and it also ensures that revenues are 
allocated to reach Ontario’s reduction targets more efficiently. The CELA also suggests that in 
these annual reports, justifications should be included as to why funds were allocated to a 
particular project and as to why funds were not allocated to other tabled proposals (Ibid, p. 13). 
Lastly, the CELA suggests that the Minister should publish a detailed plan for any funds 
remaining for the current year (Ibid). Again, the idea is to hold the Minister accountable for the 
Province’s spending and to ensure that Account funds get allocated to their intended purpose, 
which is reducing GHG emissions. 
As for free allowances that are allocated to large emitters, 24 months after allocation, the 
Minister needs to make public a list of emitters who received these allowances, as well as, the 
number of allowances they received (The Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change, 
2016, p. 22). The Minister must also make the plan to phase out free emission allowances 
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available to the pubic (Ibid, p. 23). The ECO stipulates that while free allowances are reported, 
24-months after the fact is limited, late, and not conducive of public trust (Saxe, Cap and Trade, 
2016, p. 77). A 24-month disclosure rate would lend itself to suggest that the earliest the public 
would know which emitters received free allowances would be 2019. 
It should be noted that Environmental Commissioner of Ontario is an independent officer 
of the Ontario Legislative Assembly that was created under the Environmental Bill of Rights 
(Lysyk, 2016, p. 202). As per the EBR, the ECO is responsible to annually report on the progress 
of the activities taken in Ontario with respect to reducing GHG emissions (Ibid).     
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3.4 Quebec’s Cap and Trade System: 
 
3.4.1 Criteria A: Policy Effectiveness  
 
1A) What is the scope (coverage of carbon) of the policy? Are there any exemptions? If so, 
what are the extent of the exemptions?  
 
Quebec’s C&T system encompasses all emitters whose annual emissions exceed 
25,000tCO2e (Government of Quebec, Quebec’s Cap-and-Trade System for Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Allowances: Technical Overview, 2014, p. 7). This equates to 80 facilities, which 
make up approximately 85% of Quebec’s CO2 emissions (Ibid). Facilities that distribute or 
import fossil fuels into Quebec will also be covered under the C&T system (Quebec Ministry of 
Sustainable Development & Environment and Parks, 2012, p. 21). Like Ontario’s system, for 
individuals, organizations, or emitters that emit less than 25,000tCO2e per year, although they 
are not covered by the system, they can participate in the carbon market (Government of Quebec, 
A Brief Look at the Quebec Cap-and-Trade System for Emission Allowances, 2016, p. 1). At the 
end of each compliance period, emitters must have enough credits acquired to cover the number 
of emissions they have emitted. These credits can be acquired through auctions, the secondary 
market, the acquisition of offset credits, or early reduction credits. 
For industrial emitters exposed to foreign competition, the Quebec government will be 
allocating most of their emissions allowances free of charge to prevent carbon leakage (Ibid, p. 
2). The number of allowances allocated decreases approximately 1% to 2% each year to 
encourage GHG reductions (Ibid). Electricity producers and fossil fuel distributors are not 
eligible to receive their emissions allowances free of charge (Ibid). Quebec’s rationale is that 
exposed industries may be less successful at recouping their compliance costs through raising 
their prices since they are more susceptible to competitors, and in turn, more vulnerable to 
carbon leakage (Government of Quebec, Strengths and Advantages of Quebec's Cap-and-Trade 
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System, 2016, p. 6). On the other hand, electricity and fossil fuel distributors can pass their 
compliance costs downstream onto their consumers (Ibid). Notably, the allocation of emission 
allowances is not a blanketed approach, they are calculated on a case-by-case basis and are 
determined by actual annual production and profit levels should a voluntary decrease in 
production occur (Ibid, p. 8). The following industries are eligible for free emissions allowances: 
aluminium, lime, cement, chemical and petrochemical industry, metallurgy, mining and 
pelletizing, pulp and paper, petroleum refining, glass containers, electrodes, gypsum products, 
and certain agri-food establishments (Government of Quebec, Quebec's Cap-and-Trade System - 
Technical overview, 2014, p. 8). When free allowances are allocated, the Minister issues a notice 
in the Québec Official Gazette stating the number of allowances distributed and the names of the 
recipients (Ibid). This notice is then posted online and made accessible to the public. The only 
discrepancy is that it is unknown how many allowances each facility is given.   
The industries in question which are eligible for free allowances are mostly from 
industrial processes and industrial combustion: oil refineries (2.48 MtCO2e), pulp and paper 
(1.27 MtCO2e), chemicals (1.19 MtCO2e), ferrous metal (3.14 MtCO2e), cement and lime plants 
(2.9 MtCO2e), non-ferrous metals (0.55 MtCO2e), and aluminum production (5.3 MtCO2e) 
(Government of Quebec, Quebec Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventory in 2014 and Their 
Evolution Since 1990, 2016, pp. 21-22). The entire industrial sector in Quebec is responsible for 
approximately 26 MtCO2e (Ibid, p. 21). In 2013, the ministry distributed 18,952,508 emission 
allowances (18.95 MtCO2e) to 55 emitters in Quebec (Quebec Ministry of Sustainable 
Development Environment and Fighting Climate Change, 2013, p. 1). In 2014, the Ministry 
distributed 18,664,613 (18.66 MtCO2e) to 52 emitters (Quebec Ministry of Sustainable 
Development Environment and Fighting Climate Change, 2014, p. 1). Lastly, in 2015, the 
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Ministry distributed 18,827,658 (18.82 MtCO2e) emissions allowances to 53 emitters (Quebec 
Ministry of Sustainable Development, Environment and Fighting Climate Change, 2015, p. 1). 
These allowance figures suggest that over 70% of Quebec’s industrial sector is eligible for free 
allowances. Regarding Quebec as a whole, free emission allowances are being allocated to 
approximately 23% of Quebec’s emissions, meaning that the current scope of Quebec’s C&T 
system is approximately 77%.   
2A) How does the carbon price influence the cost of direct uses of carbon and to what 
extent are carbon reductions being undertaken? 
 
Quebec’s C&T system linked up with California’s C&T system under the Western 
Climate Initiative on January 1
st
, 2014 (Government of Quebec, Quebec’s Cap-and-Trade 
System for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowances: Technical Overview, 2014, p. 5). Like 
Ontario’s, the power of Quebec’s C&T system comes from its allowances. Every year, the 
number of emission permits or credits made available for purchase decreases. This acts as a 
constant incentive for regulated emitters to reduce their emissions, adopt more energy efficient 
processes, and shift towards renewable energy or low-carbon alternatives (Government of 
Quebec, 2016, p. 2).  
For auctions held in Quebec, the floor price on carbon was set in 2012 at $10/tCO2e, 
which is to increase 5% plus inflation each year until 2020 (Government of Quebec, Quebec’s 
Cap-and-Trade System for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowances: Technical Overview, 2014, p. 
8). The current floor price for emission allowances in Quebec auctions is $11.39 (Government of 
Quebec, Strengths and Advantages of Quebec's Cap-and-Trade System, 2016, p. 6). As for joint-
auctions between Quebec, California, and soon to be Ontario, the floor price for emission 
allowances is currently $13.56, which increases 5% each year plus inflation (Government of 
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Quebec, Historical Overview of Quebec's Cap-and-Trade System and WCI's Regional Carbon 
Market, 2016, p. 7). It should be noted that the price of emission allowances at joint-auctions are 
set in USD, which means that Canadian allowance prices are subject to currency fluctuations. 
The extent to which emission reductions would be undertaken correlates to the floor price 
of carbon. For Quebec auctions, this is $11.39, while for joint-auctions it is $18.82 (floor price of 
May 16, 2017 auctions). It should be noted that a Quebec-only auction has not been held since 
August of 2014. However, for a few reasons which I will discuss below, there has been some 
volatility in the Quebec market, both regarding allowance prices and allowances sold.    
It is estimated that Quebec’s C&T system will affect Quebec’s economy in a very similar 
way as it is projected to affect California’s (Purdon, Houle, & Lachapelle, 2014, p. 34). That is, a 
reduction of BAU GDP by 2020 at an average of 0.34%, and a range of between +0.15% to -
1.40% (Ibid). For Quebec to reduce its emissions by 14.4 - 18.3 million tCO2e, it would cost 
Quebec between $694-1,030 million (Ibid, p. 36). However, because Quebec’s C&T is linked 
with California’s, Quebec is estimated to save between $387-532 million (Ibid). In turn, this also 
means that the impact on the direct cost of carbon also decreases. It is also estimated that 
between 14.4-18.3 million of excess allowances produced in California will be purchased by 
Quebec emitters (Ibid).  This decreases the incentive for firms to switch to alternatives, but 
overall it dilutes the ability for price signals to be meaningful. Since California has a surplus of 
emission allowances, it is considered a real possibility that instead of Quebec firms reducing 
their GHG emissions, they can buy their credits from California instead. Not only does this 
decrease the effectiveness of Quebec’s C&T system, but it also compromises the CCAP (Climate 
Change Action Plan) 2020, which relies on auction revenues.  
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In a study done by Barrington-Leigh et al. two different scenarios were assumed: one 
where cost pass-through was limited and one where cost pass-through was not limited. For the 
average individual living in Quebec, 83% of their direct emissions come from the use of gasoline 
(Barrington-Leigh, Tucker, & Lara, 2014, p. 28). Overall, households emit approximately 15.7 
tCO2e of direct emissions annually (Ibid, p. 23) and 10.6 tCO2e of indirect emissions (Ibid, p. 
29). In the scenario with limited cost pass-through, it was found that “direct fuel consumption for 
heating and transport by households is closely related to income (Ibid, p. 31).” This relationship 
is considered to be more regressive for the second scenario assuming full cost pass-through (Ibid, 
p. 32).  
The extent that Quebec’s C&T system is likely to affect the price of gasoline is minimal 
(Ibid). Carbon prices of $25/tCO2e and $48.20/tCO2e are only expected to raise gasoline prices 
by $0.05 and $0.10 per litre, respectively (Ibid). Assuming a price of carbon at the ceiling price, 
the average spending on gasoline is only expected to decrease by $42.40 annually (Ibid, p. 34). 
These changes are characterized as “moderate (Ibid).” Also, it is stated that “incentives to reduce 
gasoline use will need to come from elsewhere (Ibid).” It is estimated that for Quebec to meet its 
2020 emissions reductions targets, it would cost the average Quebec resident $255 annually 
(Ibid, p. 18). The Auditor General of Quebec shares similar comments. In the Spring 2016 Audit 
gas prices have only increased $0.04 as a result of Quebec’s C&T system, which the Auditor 
General unquestionably describes as a “weak price signal (Auditor General of Québec, 
Observations of the Sustainable Development Commissioner, Mr. Jean Cinq-Mars, 2016, p. 9).” 
The Auditor General goes on to suggest that if the price signal remains weak, and does not 
become more aggressive, Quebec’s emission reduction targets will remain an ambitious venture 
(Ibid, p. 10). Although not particularly relevant in this section, the Auditor General does state 
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that the allocation of free emission allowances is hindering behavioural change (Ibid). The 
Pembina Institute agrees that Quebec’s C&T system lacks cohesive power: “Quebec [needs] to 
be more ambitious in setting its price floors because … $15/tCO2e in 2013 and escalating to 
$25.77/tCO2e in 2020 is relatively low [in relation to] … what will be needed to achieve 
meaningful change in the Quebec (Horne & Partington, Recommendations for Quebec’s draft 
cap-and-trade regulations, 2011, p. 4)”.   
Throughout all the auctions that were held either by Quebec, or joint-auctions, the 
average selling price has always been higher than the minimum price of emission allowances for 
that year. Despite this, credits have not sold as anticipated. At the latest joint-auction in May 
2017, 100% of allowances sold where the floor price was $18.51, with the average sale price of 
allowances was $19.74. However, it would seem that a sell-out is an anomaly when compared to 
the past allowance sales. In November, August, and May auctions the ratio of emission 
allowances provided versus sold were 88%, 35%, and 11%, respectively. After that, November 
2015, August 2015, and May 2015 auctions all performed well with selling percentages of 100%, 
95%, and 85% respectively. 
In a C&T system it is difficult to point to one variable as the sole cause for inconsistent 
auction results, and indeed as should be expected, in this case, there are many. It has been noted 
by the ECO that because California’s credits greatly outnumber Ontario’s credits (Quebec having 
even less than Ontario) that not only will California have a cumulative surplus of unneeded 
allowances, but because California is less stringent and has a slower cap decline rate, it becomes 
a real possibility that Quebec firms can purchase some of their credits from California instead of 
Quebec (Saxe, Cap and Trade, 2016, pp. 71-72). Other issues that can cause market and auction 
inconsistency are due to California’s legal troubles: “There are legal doubts about whether the 
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California program will survive its litigation and legislative challenges long enough to reach the 
next decade. This legal uncertainty has contributed, in part, to suppress the selling price of 
allowances (Ibid, p. 72).” Inconsistent auctions could also be a ploy by some emitters gambling 
by not purchasing emission credits during the auction and hoping to buy them on the secondary 
market at a lower cost (Blinch, 2016). According to Dave Sawyer of EnviroEconomics, 
inconsistency in auctions could also be a sign that the C&T system is working and reductions are 
being achieved quicker than expected, meaning fewer allowances are necessary (Ibid). Other 
commentators have also cited an oversupply of emissions credits, legal uncertainty, and long 
compliance periods as the reasons for auction inconsistency (Busch, 2017).  
The incentive behind an economy based instrument is that the price on carbon creates a 
price signal that influences individuals to invest in lower carbon alternatives. This process is 
incentivized further by reallocating generated revenues towards these alternatives, thereby 
making it more advantageous for individuals to switch to the alternative. Although extensive data 
does not yet exist for the relationship between Quebec’s C&T system and the effect it has on 
direct uses of carbon, the data does exist suggests that the price put on carbon is currently too 
low for significant behaviour change. In other words, the price is not yet such that it would 
incentivize individuals to switch to alternatives.  
3A) Is the policy on-track to achieving its own carbon reduction target, and is the policy 
on-track to achieving its respective province’s carbon reduction target? 
 
Quebec’s emissions reduction goals are 20% below 1990 levels by 2020 (71MtCO2e) and 
37.5% below 1990 levels by 2030 (55 MtCO2e) (Ministry of Sustainable Development, 
Environment & the Fight Against Climate Change, 2017). According to the Quebec government, 
the former target should be achieved by the CCAP and the C&T system (Ibid). As for the latter 
target, there are no concrete actions in place to achieve this target besides “the urgent need to act 
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(Ibid).” According to Quebec’s Normal Course of Business (NCB) or BAU, Quebec’s 2020 
GHG emissions should be 84.4MtCO2e (Quebec Ministry of Sustainable Development & 
Environment and Parks, 2012, p. 47). For Quebec to achieve its GHG reduction target of 20% 
below 1990 levels, Quebec’s NCB is required to drop by approximately 17MtCO2e (Ibid). 
Notably, Quebec’s NCB is re-evaluated yearly to enable the Quebec government to better 
understand what changes are required to reduce their GHG emissions accordingly (Ibid). As of 
March 31
st
, 2015, from 2013-2014, Quebec’s GHG emissions have dropped by 0.92 MtCO2e 
(The Ministry of Sustainable Development, Environment and the Fight against Climate Change, 
2017, p. 3). The majority of these reductions came from the energy and transportation sectors 
(Ibid).   
To date, several programs invested in through the Green Fund have reduced Quebec’s 
GHG emissions by 0.2MtCO2e annually (Ibid, p. 12). Examples of these initiatives include an 
increase in fuel-efficient vehicles, green fleets, and an increase in energy efficient buildings both 
commercial and residential (Ibid). By 2020, 2 MtCO2e are expected to be reduced annually 
through these projects (Ibid). The government of Quebec notes that while investment in some 
programs may not immediately reduce many GHG emissions, the government is anticipating that 
the new technologies and innovations, which are created through these programs and the possible 
behaviour change that comes with it to eventually reduce emissions (Ibid). It is estimated that by 
2020, should all of Quebec’s CCAP programs be implemented, Quebec’s GHG emissions would 
be reduced by 6MtCO2e (The Ministry of Sustainable Development, Environment and the Fight 
against Climate Change, 2017, p. 9). Even if we consider the 2MtCO2e as additional emission 
reductions, Quebec is still 11MtCO2e short of its 2020 target. 
72 
 
Between 2010 and 2014, industrial emissions have been “stable” at approximately 
25MtCO2e (Government of Quebec, Quebec Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventory in 2014 and 
Their Evolution Since 1990, 2016, p. 16). While emissions have dropped an average of 2.5% 
each year for the transportation sector after implementation, as of 2014, transportation emissions 
were reported to be 33.67MtCO2e (Ibid). Decreases in emissions have also been found in the 
heating of buildings, both commercial and residential (Ibid, p. 13). However, the province of 
Quebec has experienced a “stable” overall level of emissions at 82 MtCO2e (Ibid, p. 16). 
Although emissions have not increased, they have not decreased either since the implementation 
of Quebec’s C&T system.  
Quebec’s C&T was established in 2012, but perhaps the “stability” of the province’s 
emissions can be attributed to only industrial and electricity sectors being covered for the first 
compliance period. It was not until 2015 where fossil fuel distributors were covered by the C&T 
system (Ibid). It should stand to suggest that with a tighter scope, 2015 emissions should be 
reduced. However, it is too early to say since the most recent emissions report is for 2014. 
According to Clean Energy Canada, it is still too early to determine the effectiveness of 
Quebec’s C&T system (Clean Energy Canada, 2015, p. 26). It is also estimated that Quebec’s 
CCAP will only account for approximately half of the emissions required for Quebec to meet its 
2020 targets (Ibid, p. 24). As was mentioned in earlier sections, at the current price of carbon in 
Quebec, significant behaviour changes will not occur. Even at the ceiling price of carbon, 
behaviour change is still estimated to be minimal.    
 
3.4.2 Criteria B: Allocation of Public Resources 
 
1B) Where are policy generated revenues being allocated to? 
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In 2006 the Green Fund was created to promote sustainable development in Québec 
(Government of Quebec, Green Fund, 2017). All C&T auction revenues are put into the Green 
Fund, which are then used to carry out the initiatives and programs outlined in Quebec’s 2013-
2020 Climate Change Action Plan (Ibid). Revenues allocated to Quebec’s Climate Change 
Action Plan center around reducing GHG emissions, mitigating economic and social pitfalls that 
stem from these reductions, and increased public awareness and adaptation of climate change 
and global warming (Government of Quebec, Green Fund - Management Framework, 2016, p. 
7). During the 2015-2016 fiscal year, $996.7 million was put into the Green Fund (The Ministry 
of Sustainable Development, Environment and the Fight against Climate Change, 2017, p. 7). It 
is estimated that by 2020, $3.3 billion is to be put into the Green Fund and invested into the 
implementation of 30 priorities and over 150 actions to reduce GHG emissions in Quebec (Ibid, 
p. 11). Since the majority of Quebec’s emissions come from the transportation sector, two-thirds 
of the Green Fund will be allocated to reducing GHG emissions from this sector (Quebec 
Ministry of Sustainable Development & Environment and Parks, 2012, p. 22). Such programs 
include improving public transportation and increasing efficiency and innovation in all modes of 
transportation (Ibid). Quebec has also allocated $140 million to public transportation in a bid to 
increase ridership and decrease GHG emissions. The government will be implementing a 
complementary light-duty vehicle inspection and maintenance program, which although as of yet 
has not, has the capacity to be expanded to other classes of vehicles, such that vehicles over eight 
years old are required to complete an environmental compliance inspection when ownership 
changes (Ibid, p. 24). Other such programs involve providing individuals with up to $8,000 in 
subsidies to incentivize them to purchase electric vehicles (Government of Quebec, Transport 
Electrification Action Plan, 2011). A $5,000 subsidy is also available for the installation of 
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charging stations, either for personal or business use (Government of Quebec, Transport 
Electrification Action Plan, 2011). For subsidies like this, it is important to keep in mind the 
comments made by the ECO, which are that these types of subsidies only benefit those 
individuals that have the means to purchase an electric vehicle in the first place.      
Quebec will also be allocating Green Fund money to technological development and 
innovation. Quebec has offered financial support to firms that engage in R&D that centers 
around new technologies that have the potential to significantly reduce GHG emissions (Quebec 
Ministry of Sustainable Development & Environment and Parks, 2012, p. 13). Quebec will also 
be providing financial assistance to businesses that are willing to equip their facilities with new 
low-carbon technologies (Ibid). While these particular projects are not expected to reduce GHG 
emissions significantly, according to the Green Fund Accounts report, $4.4 million has been 
allocated to these types of projects (Government of Quebec, Green Fund - Management 
Framework, 2016, p. 15). 
One stark omission from Quebec’s CCAP is the notion of disproportional impacts. From 
the programs offered by CCAP and funded through the Green Fund, it would seem that while 
Quebec is not addressing disproportional impacts directly, they may be doing so indirectly. One 
program that Quebec is focusing on is “consciousness-raising,” that is, the implementation of 
educational institutions that will create awareness and hopefully initiatives that will reduce GHG 
emissions (Quebec Ministry of Sustainable Development & Environment and Parks, 2012, p. 
16). It would seem that Quebec is relying on the enhancement of energy performance in both 
buildings and vehicles, which in turn will make these two sectors “less vulnerable to higher 
energy prices (Ibid, p. 18).” Ultimately, Quebec’s position seems to be that “taxpayers will 
benefit through lower costs stemming from efficiency gains (Ibid).” According to the Green 
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Fund Accounts report, there are several programs allocated to energy efficiency. The Fund 
allocates close to $80 million cumulatively to these types of programs, which are estimated to 
reduce GHG emissions by 1.36 MtCO2e by 2020 (Government of Quebec, Green Fund - 
Management Framework, 2016, p. 13).   
Another program that would benefit individuals through efficiency gains is Quebec’s 
program aimed at providing funds to replace all heating systems within all existing buildings that 
still use light fuel oil (Quebec Ministry of Sustainable Development & Environment and Parks, 
2012, p. 18). For residents within Quebec that still use light fuel oil to heat their homes, the 
government will financially support these residents who wish to convert their fossil fuel heating 
systems to systems that rely on geothermal, hydroelectric, wind or solar power (Quebec Ministry 
of Sustainable Development & Environment and Parks, 2012, p. 29). A similar subsidy program 
will be offered to commercial buildings for the same conversion (Ibid). Also, for the construction 
of new buildings, it will be mandatory that their heating systems be either geothermal, solar 
power, wind power, or hydroelectric (Ibid, p. 18). 
It is usually agreed upon that one main avenue in which C&T or tax revenues are 
allocated to is investing in alternative, greener, or less carbon-intensive forms of energy. 
However, because 97% of Quebec’s energy comes primarily from renewable energy, Green 
Fund revenues are allocated towards the transportation, industry, and building sectors (Ibid, p. 
44). Additionally, it should not be ignored that Quebec’s plan to reduce its GHG emissions are 
reliant on the revenues collected from its C&T auctions (Quebec Ministry of Sustainable 
Development & Environment and Parks, 2012, p. 43). CCAP 2020 only considers program 
allocations if all allowances are sold at the floor price. As such, there is a possibility that funds 
allocated to programs would be less than initially expected. On the other hand, there is also a 
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possibility for surplus revenues to be made available for re-investment (Ibid). However, it is 
noted in the CCAP that any additional funds will be allocated towards the attainment of CCAP 
objectives (Ibid).  
Lastly, large emitters are not mentioned in this section because Quebec has decided to 
address carbon leakage through allocating free emissions credits instead of C&T revenues.  
 
3.4.3 Criteria C: Policy Design 
 
1C) Is the policy simple and clear? 
 
Regarding gaming prevention, the Quebec system requires that mandatory and voluntary 
emitters register to participate in the C&T system. Registering ensures that allowances that are 
being purchased or traded are indeed going to the participant in question (Auditor General of 
Québec, Carbon Market: Description and Issues, 2016, p. 25). It is also used to determine the 
risk of non-compliant behaviour by each participant (Ibid). Once registered, all transactions, 
whether they are from the auctions or in the secondary market, are kept track of by the WCI’s 
centralized registration system (the CITSS) (Ibid, p. 26). Although this does not eliminate the 
possibility of fraud, it does limit its application (Ibid). 
To reduce market manipulation, there is a limit as to how many credits any one 
participant can purchase at auction (Ibid). For mandatory participants, one entity cannot purchase 
more than 25% of the total amount of allowances available for sale for that year (Ibid). Entities 
are also limited by the number of allowances they can possess at any one time (Ibid). Should this 
limit be exceeded, the Minister has the authority to confiscate allowances (Ibid). To limit 
collusion during auctions, bidders are not permitted to disclose their involvement in the auction 
and any entity with privileged information is not permitted to bid on allowances (Ibid, p. 27). To 
prevent over-allocation of credits into the market, the Minister may take unsold credits out of 
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circulation and put them back into circulation when the selling price for allowances climbs above 
the minimum auction price (Benoit & Côté, 2015, p. 57). To prevent non-compliance (emitters 
not purchasing enough credits for the amount of emissions they released during the compliance 
period), in addition to a possible fine, the Minister can suspend any allocation of allowances to 
the emitter in question (International Carbon Action Partnership, 2017, p. 5). The emitter must 
also remit the total amount of credits missing plus three additional credits for each missing credit 
(Ibid). 
For projects that are eligible for offset credits, to receive these credits, facilities must be 
verified and reports validated in compliance with ISO standards (Government of Quebec, 
Strengths and Advantages of Quebec's Cap-and-Trade System, 2016, p. 7). Additionally, to 
avoid double-counting the offset credits, whether used or sold, must stay within the jurisdiction 
that awarded them (Ibid). Should there be any illegitimacy issues, the emitter which was awarded 
the offset is responsible for each illegitimate credit (Ibid). 
An offset credit registry is provided online and can be accessed publicly. The registry 
provides the name of the operation, its location, description, the amount of emissions credits the 
operator is expected to receive (or the amount of credits the project is expected to generate), and 
whether the allowances were issued or not (The Ministry of Sustainable Development, 
Environment and the Fight against Climate Change, 2017). Lastly, any relevant documents are 
also made available for the projects in question (Ibid). If it is found that reductions did not occur, 
the project proponent must replace the same amount of offset credits it received (Government of 
Quebec, Quebec's Cap-and-Trade System - Technical overview, 2014, p. 10).  
 With regards to public opinion, many commentators suggest that the reason Quebec was 
the pioneering province for C&T in Canada is due to positive public opinion: “In contrast [to] … 
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much of North America, climate policy has never been a controversial political issue in Québec. 
Public opinion polls have … demonstrated that Quebecers accept climate science, prefer taking 
action now, [and] are more concerned about the impacts of climate change (Purdon, Houle, & 
Lachapelle, 2014, p. 40).” Additionally: “Quebecers know and understand that human activity 
causes global warming; therefore, caring about climate disruption is a political winner in the 
province (Clean Energy Canada, 2015, p. 8).” Polling data seems to represent this. For example, 
“The strongest levels of climate change belief exist in … BC, Quebec [and], Nova Scotia 
(Mildenberger, et al., 2016, p. 7).” Also, “places that are more significantly contributing to 
climate change show lower beliefs that humans are the cause (Ibid).” These places would include 
Alberta and Saskatchewan (Ibid). While I have not been able to find public opinion polls solely 
for Quebec, national polling data paints Quebec as a pro-climate change province. In an Angus 
Reid poll, 81% of Quebecers were supportive of a national C&T system, in which the split falls 
to 68% for a national carbon tax and 32% against it (The Angus Reid Institute, Most Canadians 
support carbon pricing; but less consensus on effectiveness of such measures, 2015, pp. 2-3). In a 
Nanos survey, it was found that 65% of Quebecers are willing to pay more if it means meeting 
environmental commitments (CTV News / Nanos, 2015, p. 4). Additionally, 75% of Quebecers 
believe that climate change is a threat and that the science behind it cannot be denied (Ibid, pp. 6-
7). Except for British Columbia, the other provinces examined in this paper, public perception 
towards climate change and market mechanisms has not been great. However, as can be seen in 
Quebec, public opinion is undeniably positive. One reason for this is that public opinion towards 
climate change in Quebec has always been favourable (Purdon, Houle, & Lachapelle, 2014, p. 
40). Another reason is that opposition from the fossil fuel industry in Quebec has been limited 
(Ibid, p. 41). 
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 For cost implementation, it is largely unclear how much money the Quebec government 
allocated to the implementation of its C&T system. No figures that would shed light on the cost 
of implementation were found. What is known is that in 2005 the Quebec Minister of the 
Environment commissioned a report to understand the feasibility of a C&T program.  
2C) How rigorous is the policy; is the policy evaluated regularly, and is the policy 
transparent? 
 
In Quebec, it is the responsibility of the Ministry of Sustainable Development, 
Environment and Climate Change to collect emissions data and measure Quebec’s GHG 
emissions through the province’s GHG inventory. It is the responsibilities of facilities and 
businesses that emit 10,000tCO2e or more annually to report their emissions every year before 
June 1
st
 (Government of Quebec, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Registry, 2017). For emitters that 
emit 25,000tCO2e or more per year, third-party verification is required (Government of Quebec, 
Quebec's Cap-and-Trade System - Technical overview, 2014, p. 12). Yearly emissions reports 
are made available to the public, in which the most recent emissions report is from 2014. 
Each year, The Minister of Sustainable Development, Environment and the Fight Against 
Climate Change must publish a report on the implementation of CCAP 2020 (Quebec Ministry 
of Sustainable Development & Environment and Parks, 2012, p. 41). This report is meant to 
record the progress of each program that is slated to be implemented, as well as, the progress of 
each program that has already been implemented (Ibid). Every three years the Minister releases a 
general evaluation report (Ibid). These reports are meant to monitor CCAP 2020 outcomes, with 
one of the highlights of the report being that there will be a section that will show the 
discrepancies between anticipated and actual results (Ibid, p. 42). Furthermore, CCAP 2020 will 
be evaluated at its midpoint to ensure that the funds allocated to the particular projects have been 
effective in creating results relative to the results that were anticipated (Ibid). Every year, the 
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Ministry of Sustainable Development, the Environment and Climate Change, must also release 
annual reports which present the progress of the Ministry’s objectives for that year (Government 
of Quebec, Green Fund - Management Framework, 2016, p. 19). The plan must include how 
much Green Fund money was used for the Ministry’s objectives, which projects received Fund 
money and how much, and the results of each Ministry project (Ibid). Lastly, the Minister must 
disclose how much money was put into the Green Fund for that year (Ibid).  
The Green Fund itself undergoes periodic monitoring, which ensures that programs that 
were given money are kept track of (Government of Quebec, Green Fund - Management 
Framework, 2016, p. 17). Not only does this provide more transparency when programs undergo 
overall assessments, but it allows for corrective actions to be taken, when necessary (Ibid). When 
Green Fund programs are evaluated, the results of the program are compared against its benefits 
and goals (Ibid). Ultimately, recommendations are made as to whether the program should be 
renewed, altered, or stopped altogether (Ibid). Additionally, the government has a website 
completely dedicated to its C&T program, where one can view the CCAP, the progress of CCAP 
programs, auction results, offset credits, Quebec’s GHG inventory, the Green Fund, and all 
projects that are funded by Green Fund money. 
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Chapter 4: Recommendations and Conclusions: 
4.1 British Columbia:  
1. The price of carbon needs to be raised $10/tCO2e per year until the price on carbon 
hits a minimum of $100/tCO2e 
In the BC case study, it was pointed out that BC will not meet its 2020 emissions 
reduction targets. It was recommended that an expanded scope and a higher price of carbon are 
required. Regarding the former, BC’s scope is already considered as one that is very lean with 
few exemptions. However, for the latter, there is a clear correlation between emissions 
reductions and the ‘ramping’ of the tax. In BC, emissions levels are such that when ramping 
stops, emissions rise, but when ramping starts, emissions drop. For BC to maintain emission 
reductions, it would also need to maintain this ‘ramping’ effect as to incentivize further 
behavioural shifts. BC’s Climate Leadership Team has made it clear that CO2e reductions in BC 
have stalled. In agreeing with the Leadership Team, BC’s carbon tax needs to be more 
aggressive if BC is to achieve its GHG reduction targets. An aggressive $10 per year increase to 
the price of carbon until it reaches $100/tCO2e has been suggested for BC. Modeling data has 
suggested that if implemented, the carbon tax will enable BC to achieve its 2050 GHG emissions 
reduction targets. 
 
2. A portion of generated revenues need to be allocated to renewable technologies and 
incentive programs 
Another big point of contention for BC’s carbon tax is how tax generated revenues are 
allocated. Currently, the tax is revenue-neutral, which means that whatever money the tax 
collects is redistributed back to the public, either in the form of a rebate or different subsidies. 
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While the redistribution aspect of BC’s tax that covers disproportional effects can stay as is, the 
revenues that are allocated to other social programs can be reallocated to green technological 
development and behavioural incentive programs. Currently, the way that revenues are allocated, 
they are not producing further emissions reductions. By reallocating funds towards renewable 
development and incentive programs, further emissions reductions can be achieved. Just as the 
Minister is mandated to provide a revenue-neutral carbon tax, the Minister can be equally 
mandated to ensure that whatever funds are not used towards reducing disproportional impacts 
goes towards clean energy, retrofits, and incentive programs; or in other words, methods that 
would seek to reduce emissions further. 
4.2 Alberta: 
1. The province of Alberta needs to significantly expand the carbon levy’s scope. 
Overall, making recommendations for Alberta’s carbon levy may prove to be difficult, 
primarily because the levy is not completed. However, Alberta’s carbon levy needs a less lenient 
scope. Since SGER emitters make up approximately half of the province’s emissions, any 
exemption given to SGER emissions is detrimental to the levy’s scope. While the fate of the 
SGER standard is not entirely known, that is, whether SGER facilities will be amalgamated 
under the carbon levy or covered via an ETS, the province must be careful in the way they 
exempt SGER emitters should they decide to do so. For Alberta to maintain a proper scope, one 
that is comparable with BC’s, SGER emitters must be responsible for at least 60% of their 
emissions. This means that at most SGER emitters can only be given a maximum exemption on 
40% of their emissions. Ultimately, the province’s scope plays a big role in determining whether 
the policy will result in emissions reductions. While concerns about competitiveness are a huge 
factor in determining a policy’s scope, having a scope that is too lenient undermines the entire 
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purpose of the levy. A small scope not only limits the amount of emissions to be reduced, but it 
limits the emitters that have to pay for their emissions, as well as, limits the ability of the levy to 
incentivize behaviour change. Lastly, it also limits the amount of revenues the province can 
collect, which in turn also limits the amount of money the province can invest into renewables 
and other similar programs. 
I suspect that exemptions will be a large point of contention for Alberta’s carbon levy. 
Should this be the case, the province needs to adopt a reporting program analogous to that of 
Quebec. That is, the number of exemptions should be made available to the public. However, I 
think this is just the start. Again, in the event the exemptions make up a large portion of the 
levy’s scope, as they currently do, the Minister needs to make how much of an exemption each 
firm or facility is being given available and must be able to justify these exemptions (this is 
expanded on in the Ontario recommendations).   
 
2. The province of Alberta needs to increase the price put on carbon to at least 
$100/tCO2e 
Not surprisingly, a large point of contention for Alberta’s levy is the price put on carbon. 
In the Climate Leadership Report to the Minister, the estimates for how many emissions the levy 
is expected to reduce is calculated using a carbon price of $30/tCO2e that increases 2% each year 
above inflation. As is mentioned in the case study, at this price, the province will miss its 
emissions reduction targets. The reductions made at $30/tCO2e would be marginal, wherein 
behavioural change and investing in alternatives would not occur in any substantial way. What’s 
more, it is largely uncertain whether the province will indeed increase the carbon price by 2% 
each year. In the same report, it is also shown that should the province increase the carbon price 
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to $100/tCO2e; the possibility still exists that Alberta will miss its long-term emissions reduction 
goals. However, the emissions gap between Alberta’s target and actual emissions reduced will be 
much narrower than if the price stayed at $30/tCO2e. 
3. The Advisory Panels that the province has created should be mandated to have 
reporting and evaluative functions 
 In creating their carbon levy, the province of Alberta created four advisory panels: the 
Climate Change Leadership Panel, the Energy Efficiency Alberta Advisory Panel, the Climate 
Technology Task Force, and the Oil Sands Advisory Group. As mentioned in the case study, the 
latter two panels have yet to complete their respective mandate. However, the former two panels 
have each recommended that the province undertake significant reporting and evaluative 
functions to improve the effectiveness of the province’s levy. Instead of the government 
undertaking these functions, I think an easier solution would be to have the panels themselves 
carry out the reporting and evaluative function of Alberta’s carbon levy. The panels would 
effectively be performing the same task that they have been performing, which is to evaluate the 
policy and recommend what needs to be done should the province wish to achieve its reduction 
goals. On the same note, revenues generated and spent should also be reported. Such reporting 
should include what projects are being invested in, how much money is being invested, what the 
benefits are of the program, and how the program will enable the province to achieve its 
reduction goals and objections. Additionally, it should also include projects that were not 
invested in and why. Of course, reporting and evaluating should be done on a regular basis and 
reports must be made available to the public. Lastly, recommendations should be cross-
referenced with actual actions to determine whether the government did act on those 
recommendations or not. Overall, not only does extensive reporting and evaluating help the 
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province achieve its goals and objectives in the most effective manner possible, but it also adds 
transparency and legitimacy to the policy. It is a way to ensure that the province is using the 
policy for its intended purpose – reducing emissions.  
4. SGER emitters should not be covered via ETS but rather should be amalgamated as 
part of the carbon levy 
While it is uncertain whether SGER facilities will indeed be covered via an ETS, the 
possibility remains open. Ontario’s and Quebec’s C&T systems are complex, more so than BC’s 
and Alberta’s carbon tax. Furthermore, their systems rely on a centralized body to keep track of 
credits (auction, secondary, early reduction, and or offset). This is not to mention the 
administrative and enforcement burden the provinces still have the responsibility of undertaking. 
For SGER emitters to be covered via an ETS and for the remainder of the province to be covered 
via a carbon tax, it adds complexity that is not required to achieve the same goal. Effectively, 
Alberta would need a centralized body to record emissions, hold auctions, keep track of credits 
and trading, ensure that credits are submitted before compliance periods expire, prevent gaming 
of the system, and punish noncompliance. The point being, on top of all these requirements, the 
province would need to balance credit allocation and floor prices against carbon leakage and 
emission reduction goals. Of course, this is just a simple outline of some of the things required in 
an ETS. However, the point to be made is just how complex an ETS can be. As I will point out in 
the Quebec recommendations, Quebec has four years of experience with their C&T system, and 
they are still having complexity issues.    
4.3 Ontario: 
1. The province of Ontario needs to expand the scope of its C&T system 
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In the case study, it is shown that for the first compliance period, Ontario has given full 
exemptions to large emitters and the agricultural sector. It is uncertain whether these exemptions 
will carry over to the second compliance period. However, this recommendation assumes that 
they the exemptions will carry over. Both Sawyer et al. and the Institute for Competitiveness and 
Prosperity both argue that Ontario’s GDP will suffer (carbon leakage) should large emitters not 
be given free allowances (Sawyer, Peters, & Stiebert, 2016, p. 6), (The Institute for 
Competitiveness & Prosperity, 2016, p. 30). On the other hand, the ECO argues that there is no 
evidence to suggest that carbon leakage will occur without free allowances (Saxe, Cap and 
Trade, 2016, p. 68). Regardless Ontario’s current scope is currently approximately 60%, whereas 
a respectable scope is 80%. 
A potential solution to widen Ontario’s scope and decrease free allocation of credits is for 
the Minister to adopt a similar criterion to that of revenue allocation. Such a criterion can 
include: A) how does the C&T adversely impact the facility? B) is the impact such that carbon 
leakage is likely? C) is the impact adverse in comparison to similar facilities? D) what are the 
possible effects should credits not be allocated? E) how do allocating credits help Ontario 
regarding GDP and achieving its carbon reduction goals? Such a criterion, or a derivative or it, 
can help the Minister in allocating credits to those facilities that are severely vulnerable and in 
turn, are more likely susceptible to carbon leakage. Additionally, facilities will receive credits 
according to need rather than just handing out credits. By minimizing carbon leakage instead of a 
blanketed allocation, Ontario’s scope would likely improve since fewer credits would be 
allocated. Additionally, the Minister should be releasing which facility was granted free 
allowances, how many, and why with relation to the criterion. On top of the other benefits of an 
87 
 
expanded scope that I have already mentioned above, by making this information publicly 
accessible, it increases the legitimacy and transparency of the policy.  
2. The price put on carbon needs to increase to a minimum of $100/tCO2e 
Currently, the price put on carbon in Ontario is such that shifts to alternatives and behaviour 
changes will be minimal. At the current rate, Ontario’s price on carbon will not reach $30/tCO2e 
until 2028. The ECO has suggested that current estimates for the amount emissions that 
Ontario’s C&T system will reduce are likely inflated. In the best case scenario, Ontario is still 
expected to miss its 2020 reduction target by 10Mt/CO2e. It is recommended that to get shifts to 
alternatives and behaviour changes that will result in significant reductions in GHG emissions, a 
floor price on carbon of $100/tCO2 is required. 
3. The cap decline rate needs to be increased beyond 4%, as well cap availability 
require further considerations 
Currently, Ontario’s emissions cap is determined by the estimated amount of emissions to be 
emitted for that particular year minus 4%. The only other consideration that can determine the 
cap is whether the emissions cap falls in line with the provinces reduction targets. Instead, as 
recommended by the CELA, a much more effective cap would not only include the province’s 
reduction targets, but the amount of free allowances, early reduction credits, offset credits and 
must take into account the amount of credits available by jurisdictions that Ontario’s C&T 
system is linked too. By putting these restrictions and considerations into forming a cap, the 
amount of allowances available become fewer and in turn, creates further downward pressure on 
participants to reduce their emissions. Particularly, the latter consideration is crucial, as it is 
mentioned in both the Ontario and Quebec case study, California has so many credits available, 
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commentators have suggested that it is a real possibility that both Ontario and Quebec firms in 
need of credits will just purchase them from California instead of reducing their emissions.  
 As mentioned above, the cap plays a crucial role in inhibiting emissions reductions. What 
that means is that should Ontario want to achieve its reduction goals, it has been recommended 
that Ontario will have to adopt a more aggressive cap decline rate. Currently, Ontario’s cap 
decline rate is 4%, which is concerned as aggressive, is not however enough for Ontario to meet 
its reduction targets. Therefore a greater decline rate is required.  
4. Incentive programs need to such that society can benefit from them as a whole and 
not solely high-income individuals who can afford to capitalize on the incentive 
In commenting on Ontario’s C&T system, the Auditor General made it clear that the way 
Ontario seeks to use its incentive programs is flawed. By having programs that would only be 
capitalized on by those that could afford them, such as expensive retrofits, the incentive 
program’s appeal is not only limited, but the effect it will have towards reducing GHG emissions 
will be limited as well. Greater access to efficient public transportation or greater access to 
energy efficient technologies that more individuals can capitalize on and not just high-income 
earners will increase the effectiveness of these programs because they can be used by more 
individuals.  
 Also, because Ontario’s C&T system relies so heavily on the redistribution of generated 
revenues, increased transparency is required. Particularly, the ECO suggests that an annual report 
outlining where money is allocated to is not conducive to transparency. Instead, an annual report 
should include where money is being allocated too, the justification behind it (the criterion that 
the Minister uses in deciding what gets funded), what projects were not funded, and why were 
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they not funded (again using the criterion). This is needed to promote transparency, but also to 
make the spending of revenues more in line with the province’s underlined goals.     
4.4 Quebec: 
1. Quebec’s scope of its C&T system can be tightened further 
The word ‘can’ is used in this recommendation because even if Quebec does not adjust their 
scope, they are left with a scope of 77%. The manner in which Quebec allocates free allowances 
is something that should be aspired to, especially by Alberta and Ontario. Instead of a blanketed 
allocation of allowances, they are determined by a case-by-case basis, and there are clear 
requirements, such as exposure to foreign competition and the inability to pass additional costs 
downstream to consumers. The way they can expand their scope is through the decline rate of 
their free allowances. While Ontario’s decline rate is over 4%, Quebec’s is only 1-2% each year. 
By increasing the decline rate, Quebec would effectively be allocating fewer allowances over a 
shorter period, and in turn, expanding their scope at a faster rate. 
Additionally, although the Minister already publishes the amount of free allowances 
allocated in the Quebec Gazette, the Minister should go a couple of steps further by adding the 
amount of allowances each emitter was given and explain why emitter were given that amount.  
2. The price of carbon in Quebec needs to increase to a minimum of $50/tCO2e 
Currently, the price of carbon in Quebec is approximately $18/tCO2e, however, this is not a 
function of the policy itself but more due to a struggling Canadian dollar. Regardless, since 
Quebec’s C&T system started, emissions have remained “stable,” The Auditor General of 
Quebec has made it clear that the current price of carbon was not high enough to allow Quebec 
to reach its reduction targets, nor was it enough to result in significant behaviour change. 
Although the Auditor General does not specifically recommend a higher price, it is clear that one 
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is needed. While it is unclear what the new price of carbon needs to be, a good starting point 
would need to be $50/tCO2e. Although, there are speculations as to whether a carbon price of 
$50/tCO2e will be sufficient.  
3. The province of Quebec needs to create Advisory Panels  
The reason for such a recommendation is due to the auction inconsistencies and the lack of 
information regarding the reason for them. Of the many commentators I cite in the case study 
about the inconsistency of auctions, each one cites a different reason for it. For this reason, I 
think it is important for the province to establish an advisory panel to understand the different 
indicators that can influence the performance of Quebec’s C&T system. Inconsistent auctions are 
problematic because if the province does not know why the auctions are inconsistent, the 
province does not know how it should proceed. Simply, there are many reasons why a C&T 
auction can be inconsistent, and one reason could be that the C&T system is working. However, 
there are many other reasons as well, such as too many allowances available, too long 
compliance periods, early reductions or offset credits could be influencing auctions, Quebec 
firms could be purchasing allowances from other jurisdictions, or the carbon price is causing 
inconsistencies. There could be more reasons still. If the province of Quebec is unsure why the 
C&T system is operating the way that it is, how can the province be expected to alter the system 
in such a way as to ensure that their objectives are being met.  
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Conclusion:  
The landscape of Canadian climate change policy at the subnational level is divided, on 
one side, two provinces have implemented carbon taxes, and on the other, two provinces have 
implemented cap and trade systems. Of all four systems, it is clear that neither towers above the 
rest as a clear example to follow. Starting with the latter, this evaluation has made it clear that 
because both Ontario’s and Quebec’s systems are complex, there is a real impetus for extensive 
government reporting and evaluation of every respect of the system. That is, emissions reports, 
free allowance allocation, offset allocation, early reduction allocation, auction results, revenue 
collection and redistribution, and an overall system evaluation. In addition to this, not only must 
all this information be made publicly accessible, but in some instances, there needs and should 
be clear justifications for decision makings, such as the allocation of credits, and the 
redistribution of revenues. The justification aspect of the cap and trade system is particularly 
important because it forces decision-makers to justify actions such as free allowances or revenue 
reallocation that affects the system as a whole. The justification of revenue allocation ensures 
that money is not going to places that would not secure further emission reductions, and the 
justification of emissions allowances adds legitimacy to the system by not putting the burden 
only on downstream emitters, but also on large upstream emitters. More than that, the 
justification of allowance allocation gives the system a reasonable scope to work with. Without 
such a scope, minimal emissions reductions will be realized, and again only downstream emitters 
will be affected.     
The price of carbon is particularly detrimental to all four systems, but the cap and trade 
systems especially. Both systems have a carbon price that is sub $20 and will not hit $30 until 
approximately 2028. While carbon leakage is a strong incentive for a lower price on carbon, the 
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trade-off is that emissions reductions do not materialize quickly. While there are many other 
factors and a low price may not be the sole cause, Quebec serves as a perfect example. Since 
2013, the start of their cap and trade system, Quebec’s annual emissions have constantly been 
stable. The purpose of pricing carbon is to coerce individuals from using carbon. That is, those 
individuals that can no longer afford to use carbon because the price of carbon is too high, these 
individuals will seek lower cost alternatives. With such a low price on carbon, this coercion does 
not happen at a high enough rate. That is, not enough individuals are forced into alternatives, and 
as a result, the emissions reduction targets are not met. Of course, while the price on carbon is 
not the only factor in an effective market mechanism, this is especially so in a cap and trade 
system; nonetheless, the price on carbon is still an essential component.  
Another key aspect that has come out of this evaluation is the importance of the cap. In 
Ontario’s and Quebec’s case particularly, because California has a greater surplus of credits, 
there is a real possibility of Canadian firms purchasing credits from California instead of their 
respective provinces. As a result, both Quebec and Ontario need to be careful in how they issue 
their credits, in that, they need to take into consideration, free allowances, offset credits, early 
reduction credits, and the number of allowances issued by other jurisdictions. This is, of course, 
to prevent the cap from being larger than it would otherwise need to be. The cap is an integral 
component of a cap and trade system because a lower cap brings with it a higher price. It adds to 
the downward pressure provided by the price of carbon. By having a larger cap than otherwise 
needed, both provinces will lose this downward pressure resulting in fewer emission reductions. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the EU is a perfect example of what happens when over-
allocation of allowances occurs. 
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When observing the carbon taxes, it seems as if they are opposites. The similarities are 
slim, they are both carbon taxes, they both are revenue neutral, and they will both have the same 
price on carbon in 2018. When it comes to scope, BC’s does not have any major exemptions 
besides agriculture, while Alberta has many exemptions including SGER emitters. For revenue 
reallocation, BC’s tax revenues are solely going towards social programs and minimizing 
disproportional effects, while redistribution to achieve further carbon reductions is nonexistent. 
Alberta also allocates revenues towards minimizing disproportional effects; however, the 
majority of funds is said to be allocated towards further emissions reductions. Even when it 
comes to reporting and evaluation, BC’s carbon tax is reported on annually, and reviewed every 
three years by the Minister of Finance, not to mention the responsibility on the Minister to 
produce a review neutral carbon tax each year. Alberta, on the other hand, is lacking in this 
manner so much so that two of the advisory groups have recommended major improvements in 
reporting and evaluative functions. 
In performing the evaluations, a few key aspects do jump out. First is the price of carbon. 
Unlike a cap and trade system that has the cap to aid in providing downward pressure, a carbon 
tax only has to rely on the carbon price. With that said, it has also become apparent that the 
redistribution of revenues towards achieving secondary means of carbon reductions is essential. 
By allocating revenues towards, renewable forms of energy, green technologies and 
infrastructure, building retrofits, and incentive programs, help to bridge the emissions gap 
between what the tax itself will accomplish and the reduction target. Third, just like a cap and 
trade system, proper scoping is essential for carbon taxes for the same exact reasons. By having 
large emitters not covered under the tax, it severely limits the amount of reductions the tax can 
achieve. However, this is true of all exemptions, in that, every exemption made forgoes the 
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ability to reduce emissions. As such there is a fine line, while provinces do not want to leave 
themselves vulnerable to carbon leakage, there must also still be emissions reductions. Lastly, 
what is not discussed much in this paper but is important nonetheless is the clear lack of price 
ramping. The only province that utilizes the ramping effect is BC, and in the case study, I have 
shown that stopping the ramping effect has been to the taxes detriment. The ramping effect 
serves to provide constant downward pressure, and as seen in BC, without the ramping effect, 
emissions are bound to be regressive.  
As a whole, these four policies are interesting. Scoping wise, the two provinces (Ontario 
and Alberta) that have the greatest annual emissions are the two provinces that have the least 
lean scope and embody the most amount of obscurity at least with regards to large emitters. 
While the two provinces (Quebec and BC) that have the least annual emissions are the two 
provinces that have least exemptions. Not to mention that it is in the latter provinces where their 
respective policies are politically acceptable. While in the former provinces, their respective 
policies are politically unacceptable. BC and Quebec have the most rigorous and transparent 
policy, although neither is perfect. Lastly, it was challenging to collect implementation costs data 
for each policy. When trying to find figures, they were usually presented as a budget allocation 
to a government Ministry rather than a breakdown of programs or initiatives to be undertaken. 
Alberta provided the most helpful figures when it came to implementation costs because they 
reported the costs of the two advisory panels that played a role in shaping the province’s levy.    
My research question was the following: “are British Columbia’s and Alberta’s carbon 
tax, and Quebec’s and Ontario’s Cap and Trade System, cumulatively sufficient to significantly 
reduce Canada’s CO2 emissions and why?” To answer this question I have evaluated each policy 
by putting each one through an evaluative framework and observing whether the policy was able 
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to meet the criterion of a ‘good’ policy according to the framework. No one province had a 
perfect policy which satisfied all aspects of the framework. But in other respects such as the 
scope and the price, the requirement went beyond the framework itself.  
 Canada’s national GHG reduction target as outlined in the Pan-Canadian Strategy is 30% 
below 2005 levels (523 MtCO2e) by 2030. Before going any further, it needs to be reminded that 
under the best case scenario (all recommendations and more were implemented today) neither 
policy is likely to achieve its 2020 emissions reductions targets. The recommendations made 
would only enable the policies to reach their mid and long-term targets. 
BC does not have a 2030 target; instead, they have a 2020 and a 2050 target. BC’s 
emissions targets are to reduce the province’s emissions by 33% and 80% from 2007 levels by 
2020 and 2050, respectively. Currently, BC is around 20MtCO2e short of its target, and are 
unlikely to reach their 2020 target. While the price on carbon is a large point of contention, 
perhaps the largest contributor to this failure is the fact that they have no secondary means of 
reducing emissions. Since all collected review is going to social programs and none to renewable 
forms of energy or incentive programs, carbon reductions only occur as a result of the price on 
carbon. Such programs would no doubt be a requirement should further reductions want to be 
achieved.  
Alberta has taken a more diluted approach concerning the province’s emissions targets. 
In relation to the federal target, Alberta’s 2030 emissions target should be 162.96 MtCO2e (69.84 
Mt/CO2e or 30% below 2005 emissions) by 2030. However, because the province opted for a 
BAU target, while the amount of emissions to be reduced is higher, the target is less stringent 
than at the federal level. Even with a lax target, Alberta is still slated to miss its 2020 BAU 
target. I suspect, and the evaluation points to this as well, that a large factor in Alberta achieving 
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its reduction targets will be its scope. It would be interesting to know if in the modeling done for 
Alberta’s carbon tax, whether SGER emitters were amalgamated within the tax or left aside. 
Furthermore, the fact that there is a possibility that the SGER standard may be replaced by an 
ETS is problematic. Outside of this, not much else is known regarding the potential new system. 
This should be concerning because it allows the province to split their emissions in half and treat 
one half differently than the other. Whether one half will be treated less stringently than the other 
remains to be seen, however, if we use Ontario as a proxy, I suspect it will be a likely possibility.  
Ontario has taken a different yet more ambitious approach to its target, instead of 30% 
below its 2005 levels (143.08 MtCO2e) by 2030, Ontario has opted to have its target at 37% 
below its 1990 levels (114.22 MtCO2e) by 2030. Although Ontario has opted for a much more 
stringent target, the province is estimated to miss its 2020 target, 15% below 1990. Like Alberta, 
I suspect that a large factor in whether Ontario will meet its target is scope related. Regarding 
effectiveness, a blanketed free allocation of allowances is inefficient, it undermines the goal of 
the policy, it restricts the ability to create behaviour shifts, and it limits the ability of the province 
to collect and reinvest revenue. Another significant factor to consider is the cap itself. This 
equally applies to Quebec. Both systems must not have their cap determined solely on the targets 
themselves. While this would be fine if the system was not linked, in a linked system the pool of 
available allowances is not limited to one jurisdiction. Furthermore, setting the cap should also 
take into consideration the number of carbon offsets and early reduction credits made available. 
With a surplus of allowances available at any one time, the coercive power that a C&T system is 
intended to have becomes diminished. When too many allowances are made available, it 
incentivizes firms to purchase credits instead of reducing their emissions. 
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Quebec’s 2030 emissions reduction goals is 37.5% below 1990 levels (55 MtCO2e). Like 
Ontario, Quebec has also opted to achieve a more stringent target than the federal government. 
As was already mentioned, Quebec is expected to miss its 2020 target. On the same note though, 
it is proving very difficult to critique the system on the same level as the other ones examined in 
the paper. Should we examine other recommendations given not only by me but commentators 
as well, Quebec has a scope that is sufficient, free allowances are not allocated in a blanketed 
fashion, but are done so based on reducing carbon leakage, revenues are being allocated to 
programs that will allow further reductions to be realized, and it is the most transparent policy of 
all the others examined. However, these positives should not take away from the fact that 
Quebec’s C&T system has been active for years and emissions have remained stable. Perhaps 
more troubling is that neither the province nor commentators have an accurate idea as to why this 
is the case. Since a C&T system involves many different components, perhaps this is to be 
expected. Regardless as I mention a few times in the paper, without knowing how the system can 
be improved, it is difficult to improve it. As such, this is why I think that the greatest 
improvement Quebec can make is to add advisory groups similar to Alberta.  
 The policies put forward in this paper are not cumulatively sufficient to significantly 
reduce Canada’s CO2 emissions. With the recommendations that are put forward and the changes 
that are required, I find it difficult to believe that the provinces will meet their 2030 targets. On 
top of all the other changes needed to be made and the downfalls unique to each respective 
policy, perhaps the largest barrier in addition to the ones mentioned above is the price on carbon. 
Simply, $18/tCO2e and $30/tCO2e is much too low to result in any significant change. 
Furthermore, as I have shown in the BC and Alberta case study, there is a reluctance to price 
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carbon anywhere above $30/tCO2e, citing competitiveness and carbon leakage as the main 
factor.   
 While the price on carbon is indeed low, as I mentioned above, no one policy stands out 
amongst the rest as a stellar example to follow. With that said, I think the federal government can 
play a big role in providing guidance and leadership to the provinces. As I mentioned in the 
introduction, the federal government has never been aggressive in showing its power when it 
comes to the environment. Instead, the federal government has tended to defer environmental 
responsibilities to the provinces. However, because it is clear that there is a deadlock within the 
provinces, that is, no one province has implemented a policy that will aggressively reduce carbon 
emissions. This is an opportunity for the federal government to show leadership in the 
environmental sector. At least in one’s opinion, The Pan-Canadian Strategy is a clear example of 
how the federal government is showing leadership and trying to amalgamate all provinces under 
one carbon reduction policy. I have mentioned the Pan-Canadian Strategy in the introduction, 
and while it is a comprehensive plan, a few things stand out. For one, it sets out a price of carbon 
of $50/tCO2e, a price higher than all four provinces discussed in this paper. It also sets out a 
scope which should be at par with BC’s. Notably, both Alberta and Ontario easily fail to meet 
this requirement. Additionally, while whatever revenues are generated go back to their respective 
provinces, the federal government has given them leeway to spend those revenues how the 
province sees fit. Perhaps more than that, the federal government sets out guidelines for 
provinces to follow, in terms scope, a reduction target, the manner in which revenues should be 
allocated, and the types of initiatives that should be taken. It is in this way to guide reluctant 
provinces that the federal government can be a leader in promoting stronger carbon reduction 
policies.      
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Appendixes I: Evaluative Criteria 
 
Criteria A: Policy Effectiveness: Criteria B: Allocation of Public 
Resources: 
Criteria C: Policy Design: 
1A) What is the scope (coverage of 
carbon) of the policy? Are there 
any exemptions? 
 
 Coverage of at least 75% is 
considered average 
 Coverage of 75% and over is 
considered good 
 
1B) Where are policy generated 
revenues being allocated to? 
 
 Are revenues being used to 
minimize disproportional 
effects, both for industry and for 
low-income individuals 
 Are revenues being allocated 
towards energy efficient 
programs in order to expedite 
carbon reductions 
 Overall, the distribution of 
revenue is considered “good” if 
society as a whole benefits from 
the redistribution.  
1C) Is the policy simple and clear? 
 
 Policies that are ‘simple and 
clear’ usually cost less to 
implement, less likely to be 
‘gamed’, and more likely to be 
politically acceptable. For BC 
and Alberta, gaming is not taken 
into consideration, but it is for 
Ontario and Quebec.  
2A) How does the carbon price 
influence the cost of direct uses of 
carbon and to what extent are 
carbon reductions being 
undertaken? 
 
 A carbon price less than 
$30/tCO2e is considered poor 
 A carbon price of $30/tCO2e is 
considered average 
 A carbon price above 
$30/tCO2e is considered good 
 A carbon price at or above 
$50/tCO2e is considered very 
good. 
 2C) How rigorous is the policy; is 
the policy evaluated regularly, and 
is the policy transparent? 
 
 Who must have their emissions 
measured, who does the 
measurement, and are the 
measurements open to public 
scrutiny 
 Is the policy regularly evaluated 
and is it made available 
 Is there a constant issuing of 
news releases, backgrounders, 
performance reviews, and 
annual reports  
3A) Is the policy on-track to 
achieving its own carbon 
reduction target and is the policy 
on-track to achieving its respective 
province’s carbon reduction 
target? 
 
 The main determination of 
answering this question is 
available modeling data. 
However, other consideration 
should be given to a rising 
carbon price and redistribution 
of revenues to technologies. 
Consideration should be given 
to whether the government is 
taking steps to secure future 
carbon reductions 
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Appendix II: Evaluative Criteria Matrix 
 
 British Columbia’s 
Carbon Tax 
Alberta’s Carbon 
Tax 
Quebec’s Cap & 
Trade System 
Ontario’s Cap & 
Trade System 
Criteria A: Policy Effectiveness  
1A) What is the scope 
(coverage of carbon) 
of the policy? Are 
there any 
exemptions? 
  Coverage of at 
least 75% is 
considered 
average 
 Coverage of 75% 
and over is 
considered good 
 
 Scope: 75-77% of 
BC’s emissions  
 Exemptions: First 
Nations; fuel used 
as a raw material; 
fuels for export; 
locomotive, 
aviation, and 
marine fuel; 
coloured fuels for 
farmers 
 Overall BC’s 
scope offers few 
exempts and can 
be considered 
between average 
and good  
 Scope: 70-90% of 
Alberta’s 
emission 
 Exemptions: 
natural gas that is 
produced and 
consumed on-site 
by conventional 
oil and gas 
producers until 
January 2023, the 
use of fuel by 
farmers for 
farming 
operations, inter-
jurisdictional 
flights, on-reserve 
fuels for 
Indigenous 
peoples, fuels sold 
for export, and 
SGER facilities. 
 Given the 
exemptions, a 
scope of 70% is 
unlikely. 
Alberta’s scope 
for its carbon levy 
is likely around 
51%. 
 Alberta’s scope 
can be considered 
poor 
 Scope: 85% of 
Quebec’s 
emissions  
 Quebec’s scope 
encompasses all 
emitters whose 
annual emissions 
exceed 
25,000tCO2e, or 
80 facilities 
 Free emission 
allowances are 
allocated to 
industrial emitters 
exposed to 
foreign 
competition  
 The number of 
allowances 
allocated 
decreases 
approximately 1% 
to 2% each year 
 The allocation of 
emission 
allowances is 
determined on a 
case-by-case basis  
 When free 
allowances are 
taken into 
consideration, 
Quebec’s scope 
likely is around 
77%, which is 
still considered 
good. 
 Scope: 82% of 
Ontario’s 
emissions. 
 Exemptions: 
Large industrial 
emitters will have 
their emission 
allowances 
provided for them 
free of charge for 
the 2017-2020 
compliance 
period. The 
agricultural, waste 
management, and 
forestry sectors 
will not be 
required to have 
their direct 
emissions covered 
for the first 
compliance period 
 The number of 
free allowances 
allocated to large 
emitters will 
decrease 4.57% 
each year 
 For the first 
compliance period 
Ontario’s scope 
will be 58%. 
While in the 
second 
compliance period 
Ontario’s scope 
can potentially be 
increased to 75%, 
as it currently 
stands, Ontario’s 
scope is 
considered poor. 
2A) How does the 
carbon price 
influence the cost of 
direct uses of carbon 
and to what extent 
are carbon reductions 
being undertaken? 
 
 A carbon price 
less than 
$30/tCO2e is 
considered poor 
 A carbon price of 
$30/tCO2e is 
 The extent in 
which carbon 
reductions would 
be undertaken is 
whether doing so 
is cheaper than 
paying $30/tCO2e. 
 For direct costs of 
carbon 
particularly 
gasoline, at $30/ 
tCO2e, results in 
an increase of ¢ 
6.67/L.  
 The extent in 
which carbon 
reductions would 
be undertaken is 
whether doing so 
is cheaper than 
paying $30/tCO2e. 
 The cost of 
gasoline is to 
increase by 
6.73¢/L.  
 The carbon levy 
will raise 
household fuel 
 The extent in 
which carbon 
reductions would 
be undertaken is 
whether doing so 
is cheaper than 
paying the floor 
price of carbon, 
$18.82 (May 16, 
2017)   
 The floor price on 
carbon will 
increase 5% plus 
inflation each 
 The extent in 
which carbon 
reductions would 
be undertaken is 
whether doing so 
is cheaper than 
paying the floor 
price of carbon, 
$18.07 (March 22, 
2017) 
 The floor price on 
carbon will 
increase 5% plus 
inflation each year 
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considered 
average 
 A carbon price 
above $30/tCO2e 
is considered 
good 
 A carbon price at 
or above 
$50/tCO2e is 
considered very 
good. 
 Every ¢5 increase 
in the cost of 
gasoline; the 
demand for 
gasoline in BC 
reduces by 2.1%. 
 BC’s carbon price 
is considered 
average 
costs by an 
additional $508. 
Indirect costs of 
carbon will rise 
by $70 - $105. 
 Alberta’s carbon 
price is 
considered 
average 
year until 2020 
 The extent that 
Quebec’s C&T 
system is likely to 
affect the price of 
gasoline is 
minimal 
 Carbon prices of 
$25/tCO2e and 
$48.20/tCO2e are 
only expected to 
raise gasoline 
prices by $0.05 
and $0.10 per 
litre, which is 
only expected to 
decrease gasoline 
spending by 
$42.40 annually. 
 Quebec’s carbon 
price is 
considered poor 
until 2020 
 By 2020, the cost 
of carbon in 
Ontario would 
approximately be 
$20 /CO2e, and 
$30 /CO2e by 
2028.  
 The total number 
of allowances that 
are made 
available for 
purchase in 
Ontario is equal to 
the forecasted 
emissions for that 
year by covered 
emitters minus 
4%. 
 In 2019, direct 
costs of carbon 
for households are 
expected to be 
approximately 
$210 a year, plus 
an additional $75 
per year for 
indirect costs of 
carbon. 
 Ontario’s carbon 
price is 
considered poor 
3A) Is the policy on-
track to achieving its 
own carbon reduction 
target and is the 
policy on-track to 
achieving its 
respective province’s 
carbon reduction 
target? 
 
 The main 
determination of 
answering this 
question is 
available 
modeling data. 
However, other 
consideration 
should be given to 
a rising carbon 
price and 
redistribution of 
revenues to 
technologies. 
Lastly, 
consideration 
should be given to 
whether the 
government is 
taking steps to 
 Currently, it is 
unlikely that BC 
will reach its 2020 
target.  
 The province has 
also made it clear 
that there are no 
plans to either 
increase the scope 
or the price on 
carbon 
 Currently, no tax 
revenues are 
allocated towards 
green 
technologies. 
 BC is not on track 
to achieving its 
emissions targets, 
revenues are not 
allocated to 
reduce emissions 
further, but also 
the government 
has made it clear 
that necessary 
changes will not 
occur. 
 Modeling data has 
shown that 
Alberta’s carbon 
levy alone will 
not produce 
sufficient 
reductions that 
would allow the 
province to meet 
its emissions 
targets.  
 It is also too early 
to determine 
whether the 
revenues 
reallocated to 
green 
technologies will 
reduce emissions 
in a substantial 
way 
 It is too early to 
determine 
whether the 
government of 
Alberta will be 
taking additional 
steps to further 
reduce emissions. 
 The price on 
carbon is such 
that incentives to 
switch to 
alternatives are 
not high enough. 
 Although Quebec 
is investing a 
large portion of its 
revenue into the 
transportation 
sector, even if all 
CCAP programs 
are to be 
implemented, 
Quebec’s GHG 
emissions would 
be reduced 
enough for 
Quebec to reach 
its target 
 Throughout the 
joint-auctions, 
Quebec has also 
had very 
inconsistent 
auction results, 
which could play 
a role in the C&T 
systems lack 
 With a linked and 
supported system 
that Ontario has, 
not only is the 
system not 
expected to coerce 
behaviour, but the 
province is 
expected to miss 
their targets. 
 It is skeptical 
whether the C&T 
system will even 
be able to reduce 
the amount of 
emissions that the 
government has 
approximated that 
it would 
 The C&T 
generated revenue 
that is reinvested 
to further reduce 
Ontario’s 
emissions is 
unlikely to 
sufficiently close 
the emissions gap 
to allow Ontario 
to meet its 2020 
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secure future 
carbon reductions 
 
 
 Overall, it is too 
early to determine 
the effectiveness 
of Alberta’s 
carbon tax and 
whether it will 
reach its 
emissions target. 
However, it is 
clear that changes 
must be made. 
luster 
performance 
 Though Quebec 
invests revenues 
to create 
additional 
reductions, the 
province may still 
miss its emissions 
target. 
emissions 
reduction target. 
 It is too early to 
tell whether the 
government is 
willing to alter the 
structure of the 
C&T system in 
future in order to 
meet its emissions 
reduction targets. 
Although like 
Alberta in order 
for the province to 
meet its targets, 
major changes are 
required. 
Criteria B: Allocation of Public Resources 
1B) Where are policy 
generated revenues 
being allocated to? 
 
 Are revenues 
being used to 
minimize 
disproportional 
effects, both for 
industry and for 
low-income 
individuals 
 Are revenues 
being allocated 
towards energy 
efficient programs 
in order to 
expedite carbon 
reductions 
 Overall, the 
distribution of 
revenue is 
considered 
“good” if society 
as a whole 
benefits from the 
redistribution. 
 Revenue Neutral 
 Revenues are 
allocated to 
lowering personal 
income taxes, 
minimizing 
disproportional 
effects, lower 
corporate taxes, 
and taxes of small 
businesses 
 Revenue is 
allocated to other 
social programs, 
but none related 
to reducing 
emissions 
 No revenue is 
allocated to green 
technologies, 
renewables, 
sustainable 
development, or 
R&D research 
 While revenues 
are used to 
minimize 
disproportional 
effects, revenues 
are not 
redistributed to 
reducing 
emissions further. 
This eliminates 
the possibility of 
society benefiting 
as a whole. 
Instead, only 
those who benefit 
are those who fall 
under the social 
programs that BC 
 Revenue Neutral  
 $2.3 billion 
allocated to 
minimizing 
disproportional 
impacts of low 
and middle class 
households 
 $3.4 billion 
allocated to large 
scale renewable 
energy projects, 
$2.2 billion 
allocated to green 
transit 
infrastructure, 
 (at the time that 
this paper being 
written) there is 
not enough detail 
on these 
efficiency 
programs 
determine if the 
redistribute levy 
generated funds to 
energy efficient 
programs will be 
beneficial. 
 The way the 
province is 
allocating is 
revenue is 
promising, 
disproportional 
impacts can be 
minimized and 
emissions can be 
further reduced, 
overall should be 
considered 
“good”. However, 
 All C&T auction 
revenues are put 
into the Green 
Fund, which are 
used to carry out 
30 priorities and 
over 150 actions 
to reduce GHG 
emissions in 
Quebec as 
outlined in 
Quebec’s 2013-
2020 Climate 
Change Action 
Plan. 
 By 2020, $3.3 
billion is to be put 
into the Green 
Fund, where two 
thirds will be 
allocated to the 
transportation 
sector 
 Quebec will also 
be allocating 
Green Fund 
money to 
technological 
development and 
innovation, 
financial support 
to firms that 
engage in R&D 
for emissions 
reducing 
technologies, and 
financial support 
to businesses 
willing to equip 
their facilities 
with new low-
carbon 
 All generated 
revenues are 
deposited into the 
Greenhouse Gas 
Reduction 
Account. The 
Account is solely 
intended to 
provide money for 
projects and 
initiatives aimed 
at reducing GHG 
emissions, 
particularly 34 
different projects 
aimed at further 
reducing GHG 
emissions. 
 Here the 
government does 
not put revenues 
towards 
minimizing 
disproportional 
effects for low-
income 
individuals 
 Although the 
government tries 
to rationalize 
upgrade subsidies 
and reducing 
energy costs as a 
type of 
minimizing 
disproportional 
effects, it is clear 
that these 
subsidies will not 
be undertaken by 
those who are 
low-income. 
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has laid out.  because there is 
not enough 
information on 
these programs it 
cannot be 
considered as 
such. 
technologies.  
 No revenues are 
allocated towards 
minimizing 
disproportional 
effects, although 
they try to do so 
indirectly through 
consciousness-
raising and 
efficiency 
improvement in 
both buildings 
and vehicles.  
 Revenues are 
being used to 
secure future 
emissions 
reductions, 
although no to 
minimizing 
disproportional 
impacts.  
 Like Quebec, 
while further 
emissions 
reductions will be 
achieved through 
revenue 
reallocation, 
disproportional 
effects will not be 
minimalized  
Criteria C: Policy Design 
1C) Is the policy 
simple and clear? 
 
 Policies that are 
‘simple and clear’ 
usually cost less 
to implement, less 
likely to be 
‘gamed’, and 
more likely to be 
politically 
acceptable. For 
BC and Alberta, 
gaming is not 
taken into 
consideration, but 
it is for Ontario 
and Quebec. 
 Implementation 
costs of BC’s 
carbon tax are not 
explicitly stated.   
 As time has 
progressed after 
implementation, 
public acceptance 
of the tax has 
increased and has 
strengthened. 
 No figures were 
available for 
implementation 
costs, but figures 
related to the 
advisory panels 
were available.  
 The Climate 
Change Advisory 
Panel costed 
approximately 
$2.1 million, and 
the Energy 
Efficiency 
Advisory Panel 
costed 
approximately 
$7.4 million.  
 The two other 
advisory panels, 
the Climate 
Technology Task 
Force and the Oil 
Sands Advisory 
Group, neither has 
yet to complete 
their mandate. 
Presumably, these 
two advisory 
panels will 
increase the cost. 
 The levy is found 
to be politically 
unacceptable. 
Partially this is 
due to the fact 
that Alberta has 
presented an 
 It is unclear how 
much money the 
Quebec 
government 
allocated to the 
implementation of 
its C&T system. 
Although the 
Quebec Minister 
of the 
Environment 
commissioned a 
report in 2005 to 
understand the 
feasibility of a 
C&T program. 
 Quebec’s C&T 
system is 
politically 
acceptable. 
Commentators 
suggest that 
because Quebec is 
almost seen as a 
pioneer for C&T 
in Canada, it has 
bolstered positive 
public opinion. 
 For gaming 
prevention, the 
Quebec system 
requires that 
mandatory and 
voluntary emitters 
register with the 
CITSS 
 Registrations is 
also used to 
 Implementation 
costs of Ontario’s 
C&T system is 
not exactly clear. 
What is known is 
that in the 
2015/2016 annual 
report for the 
Ministry of the 
Environment and 
Climate Change, 
$191,868,000 was 
allocated to 
Environmental 
Protection 
 While not much 
polling data, what 
little there is 
suggests that 
Ontario’s C&T 
system is 
politically 
unacceptable. 
 System Gaming: 
To prevent false 
emissions 
reporting, all 
participants must 
register with the 
CITSS, as well, 
all participants 
must report their 
GHG emissions 
every year. A 
third party verifies 
all emissions 
reports 
 All participants 
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incomplete carbon 
levy. 
determine the risk 
of non-compliant 
behaviour, and to 
track all 
transactions, 
whether they are 
from the auctions 
or in the 
secondary market.  
 There is a limit as 
to how many 
credits any one 
participant can 
purchase at 
auction. 
Participants also 
cannot exceed a 
certain amount of 
credits held at any 
one time. 
 During auctions 
bidders are not 
permitted to 
disclose their 
involvement in 
the auction and 
any entity with 
privileged 
information is not 
permitted to bid 
on allowances. 
 For projects that 
are eligible for 
offset credits, 
facilities must be 
verified and 
reports validated 
in compliance 
with ISO 
standards.  
 An offset credit 
registry is 
provided online 
and can be 
accessed publicly. 
The registry 
provides the name 
of the operation, 
its location, 
description, the 
amount of 
emissions credits 
the operator is 
expected to 
receive, and 
whether the 
allowances were 
issued or not.  
will have their 
allowances 
tacked, whether 
they are given 
freely, purchased 
at auction, or 
traded in the 
secondary market  
 Currently there is 
no offset 
regulation, 
however, if the 
proposed 
regulation is 
approved, the 
Ministry of the 
Environment and 
Climate Change 
will establish a 
public online 
Offsets Registry 
that will be 
similar to 
Quebec’s. Before 
offset credit(s) are 
awarded, all offset 
related documents 
and physical sites 
must be verified 
by a third party.  
2C) How rigorous is 
the policy; is the 
policy evaluated 
regularly, and is the 
 The BC 
government 
reports its 
emissions in its 
 Annually the 
Minister of 
Environment and 
Parks provides 
 Parts of 
rigorousness is 
covered in System 
Gaming 
 Parts of 
rigorousness is 
covered in System 
Gaming 
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policy transparent? 
 
 Who must have 
their emissions 
measured, who 
does the 
measurement, and 
are the 
measurements 
open to public 
scrutiny 
 Is the policy 
regularly 
evaluated and is it 
made available 
 Is there a constant 
issuing of news 
releases, 
backgrounders, 
performance 
reviews, and 
annual reports 
GHG Inventory 
annually, which 
brakes down 
emissions by 
sector and activity 
 Industrial emitters 
that emit more 
than 10,000tCO2e 
per year must 
report their GHG 
emissions. While 
Industries that 
emit 25,000tCO2e 
per year or higher 
must have their 
emissions 
independently 
verified.  
 All emissions 
reports are 
publically 
accessible 
 Every year the 
Minister of 
Finance provides 
a schematic in 
BC’s yearly 
budget which 
shows how much 
revenue the 
carbon tax 
generated and 
where that money 
has been allocated 
to 
 Every three years 
the carbon tax is 
reviewed 
 Every two years 
the Minister of the 
Environment 
released Progress 
to Targets 
Reports, outlining 
the provinces 
progress towards 
its emissions 
targets. 
progress reports, 
as well, has the 
mandate to 
evaluate the 
carbon levy 
 Facilities that 
emit more than 
50,000 tCO2e 
annually must 
report their 
emissions, and 
must have their 
data verified by 
Environment and 
Climate Change 
Canada and the 
Alberta Climate 
Change Office. 
 Incorrect 
reporting by these 
facilities can 
result in a fine of 
up to $500,000.  
 For facilities that 
emit less than 
50,000 tCO2e per 
year, emissions’ 
reporting is 
voluntary. 
 Although GHG 
reporting for 
SGER facilities is 
made available 
for public 
scrutiny, reporting 
is three years 
behind. 
 The Minister of 
Sustainable 
Development, 
Environment and 
the Fight Against 
Climate Change 
must collect 
emissions data, 
and measure 
Quebec’s GHG 
emissions through 
the province’s 
GHG inventory. 
 Emitters that emit 
10,000tCO2e or 
more annually 
must report their 
emissions every 
year 
 For emitters that 
emit 25,000tCO2e 
or more per year, 
third party 
verification is 
required. 
 Yearly emissions 
reports are made 
available to the 
public 
 Each year, the 
Minister of 
Sustainable 
Development, 
Environment and 
the Fight Against 
Climate Change 
must publish a 
report on 
programs that are 
slated to be 
implemented, as 
well as, the 
progress of each 
program that has 
already been 
implemented from 
the CCAP 2020. 
 Every three years 
the Minister 
releases a general 
evaluation report. 
 CCAP 2020 will 
be evaluated at its 
midpoint to 
ensure that the 
funds allocated to 
the particular 
projects have 
been effective in 
creating results  
 Every year, the 
Ministry of 
 The Minister of 
the Environment 
and Climate 
Change must 
report the status 
of the actions set 
out in Ontario’s 
climate change 
action plan each 
year, and must 
then put the report 
before the General 
Assembly and 
make it publicly 
accessible 
 In order for the 
Minister to spend 
generated 
revenues, it must 
be justified using 
the criterion set 
out in the case 
study 
 As for free 
allowances that 
are allocated to 
large emitters, 24 
months after 
allocation, the 
Minister needs to 
make public a list 
of emitters who 
received these 
allowances, as 
well as, the 
amount of 
allowances they 
received. The 
Minister must also 
make the plan to 
phase out free 
emission 
allowances 
available to the 
pubic  
 Every year the 
GGRA must 
undergo annual 
reporting, 
whereby in-flows 
and out-flows and 
the respective 
descriptions are 
kept track of. It 
ensures that 
GGRA funds are 
spent in a manner 
as to result in 
reasonable GHG 
reductions. These 
reports must then 
be made 
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Sustainable 
Development, the 
Environment and 
Climate Change, 
must also release 
annual reports 
which present the 
progress of the 
Ministry’s 
objectives for that 
year. 
 The Minister must 
disclose how 
much money was 
put into the Green 
Fund for that 
year. 
 The Green Fund 
itself undergoes 
periodic 
monitoring 
 All of this 
information is 
made available 
online  
publically 
accessible.  
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Appendix III: Recommendations 
Recommendations 
British Columbia Alberta Ontario Quebec 
 The price of carbon 
needs to be raised 
$10/tCO2e per year 
until the price on 
carbon hits a 
minimum of 
$100/tCO2e 
 A portion of generated 
revenues need to be 
allocated to renewable 
technologies and 
incentive programs. 
Just as the Minister is 
mandated to provide a 
revenue-neutral 
carbon tax, the 
Minister can be 
equally mandated to 
ensure that whatever 
funds are not used 
towards reducing 
disproportional 
impacts goes towards 
clean energy, retrofits, 
and incentive 
programs. 
 The province of 
Alberta needs to 
increase the price put 
on carbon to at least 
$100/tCO2e 
 The SGER Standard 
should not be replaced 
by a new ETS, but 
rather SGER emitters 
should be 
amalgamated with the 
carbon levy 
 The scope of 
Alberta’s carbon levy 
needs to be expanded 
to include SGER 
emitters. Should 
SGER emitters be 
granted exemptions, 
they should not 
exceed 40% of the 
SGER sectors 
emissions. 
Exemptions need to 
be justified by the 
Minister, and should 
be made publically 
accessible. 
Documents pertaining 
to which firms are 
exempt and how much 
they are exempted by 
must also be made 
available to the 
public.  
 The four Advisory 
Panels the province 
has created should be 
given reporting and 
evaluative mandates. 
That is, these panels 
should be responsible 
for reporting on and 
evaluating the 
province’s carbon 
levy. 
 Ontario needs to 
expand its scope by 
changing the way free 
credits are allocated. 
A robust process that 
is analogous to how 
Ontario justifies 
spending revenues. 
 Like the Alberta 
recommendations, 
exemption figures and 
justifications need to 
be made public.   
 The price put on 
carbon needs to 
increase to a 
minimum of 
$100/tCO2e 
 The emissions 
allowance decline 
rate, while it is 
considered aggressive, 
needs to increase 
beyond 4%, as well, 
the considerations that 
go into setting the cap 
itself should not only 
include the provinces 
reduction targets, but 
the amount of free 
allowances, early 
reduction credits, 
offset credits, and the 
amount of credits 
available by 
jurisdictions, must 
also be taken into 
consideration. 
 Incentive programs 
need to such that 
society can benefit 
from them as a whole 
and not solely high 
income individuals 
who can afford to 
capitalize on the 
incentive 
 The price of carbon in 
Quebec needs to 
increase to 
$100/tCO2e 
 Like Alberta the 
province should create 
advisory panels which 
would carry out a 
similar mandate. That 
is, constantly 
reporting and 
evaluating the C&T 
system. 
 (optional) While 
Quebec has a decent 
scope, it can be 
improved, this would 
be done through 
adopting an analogous 
justification process 
for allocating free 
credits (similar to the 
recommendations in 
Ontario) 
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